Club提要：莫斯科国际关系学院国际关系系主任安德烈·苏申佐夫在三亚接受北京对话专访。他指出，“白宫争吵”表明，乌克兰在美国国际战略中的地位已下降，特朗普在乌克兰问题上采取更加现实主义的立场，而欧洲大多数国家难以坐上这一轮谈判桌。

苏申佐夫认为，美国“联俄抗中”的企图注定难以实现。过去数年的实践已充分证明，美国难以真正影响俄罗斯的战略选择，俄罗斯也已并将继续深化与中国及广大全球南方国家的战略关系，因为这些国家正成为全球发展的新重心。中俄两国在经贸与文化领域的合作基础深厚，共同建设安全、繁荣的欧亚大陆的决心坚定。

苏申佐夫接受北京对话专访

李泽西：你如何看待泽连斯基在白宫与特朗普总统和JD·万斯之间的那场争吵？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：泽连斯基把自己想象成西方的伟大领袖之一，比肩丘吉尔、戴高乐或罗斯福。他试图操纵美国政府，让华盛顿相信乌克兰不仅仅是美国战略的一枚棋子，而是一个可以在重大地缘政治博弈中发挥主体作用的国家，并且能够向美国施压，按乌克兰的想法推动这场危机的发展。然而，这次会面彻底打破了这种幻想。特朗普明确表示，他希望实现和平，而泽连斯基则试图坚持继续战争，并且要求美国提供大量支持。

从象征意义上来说，这次会面标志着美国将乌克兰作为对抗俄罗斯的战略工具的时代走向终结，同时也意味着美国开始撤回其在欧洲大陆的战略利益。

2月28日，乌克兰总统泽连斯基与美国总统特朗普、副总统万斯在白宫椭圆形办公室会面路透社

李泽西：您如何看待他提出的矿产协议？为什么特朗普会提出这样的协议？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：特朗普政府试图寻找方法，从美国对乌克兰的投资中获取回报，这包括政治投资、军事投资。美国政府过去几年，尤其是过去三年，在乌克兰投入了大量资源，而在这之前的几十年里，美国也一直在介入乌克兰事务。

特朗普认为，这些政治投资有损美国利益，不仅让美国陷入与俄罗斯的间接军事冲突，还耗费了数百亿美元。他正在试图找到一种方法，通过乌克兰的资源弥补这些损失；这可能并不仅仅局限于稀土资源，因为乌克兰的稀土储量并不丰富。但特朗普需要向他的支持者展示，他兑现了自己的承诺：首先是结束战争，然后让美国的纳税人拿回他们此前在乌克兰投入的钱。

他在试图塑造一种迅速成功的形象。他强迫泽连斯基让步，而他此前多次批评泽连斯基应该下台，称其为独裁者，并称他的支持率极低；泽连斯基如今几乎完全依赖美国的支持，因此不得不遵从华盛顿的要求，以维持自己的政治生命。

泽连斯基的处境非常艰难，他既不能让特朗普失望，又不能做出会被乌克兰民众视为“国家利益的背叛”的决定。这是一个极为棘手的局面。现在关键是，这笔交易是否真的能为美国纳税人带来经济回报。毕竟，要想在乌克兰开采资源，首先需要和平、稳定，以及与俄罗斯建立可预测的关系。这其实是乌克兰与任何国家达成重大经济协议的基本前提。

特朗普对“补偿美国的投入”这个问题非常执着，他正在试图找到合适的方法榨取回报。这项协议最终的“利润提取点”可能不仅仅是乌克兰，而是来自一些欧洲或全球南方的企业，这些企业可能会要求美国提供保护，以支持它们在乌克兰的投资项目。

特朗普的行事风格非常具有试验性，他喜欢尝试前所未有的事情，不按常规出牌。我认为他正在创造性地寻找一个可以奏效的方案。

乌克兰日托米尔地区稀土矿CNN

李泽西：乌克兰在停火谈判中的主要担忧之一是，90年代布达佩斯备忘录没有在当前危机中真正保护乌克兰。因此，乌克兰希望获得更具约束力的安全保障，以防止未来再次遭受俄罗斯的进攻。从俄罗斯的立场来看，您认为乌克兰获得哪些安全保障是可接受的？另一方面，俄罗斯又希望从北约和西方获得哪些安全保障？这些保障在现实中可行吗？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：布达佩斯备忘录的背景是乌克兰同意移除其领土上的苏联核武器。这些核武器从来不属于乌克兰，而是苏联的核武器。乌克兰无法在没有莫斯科同意的情况下单独控制或使用这些武器。美俄当时达成的共识是，这些核武器不仅应当从乌克兰撤出，也应当从白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦撤出。因此，将布达佩斯备忘录视为多边安全保障，或认为它对乌克兰的所有邻国和美国都具有约束力，这是不准确的。

更重要的是，乌克兰危机不仅仅是俄乌之间的问题，其根本是俄罗斯与北约东扩的冲突。当下情况不是俄罗斯在接近北约的边界，而是北约年复一年地向俄罗斯逼近，无论是通过推动前苏联诸国的颜色革命，还是在2014年推翻乌克兰的亚努科维奇政府，北约的步步紧逼使乌克兰成为俄罗斯与西方之间的战场。而乌克兰政府主动邀请西方影响力进入乌克兰，将本国塑造成西方的工具，这些选择实际上使乌克兰无法获得任何真正的安全保障；从这个角度来看待问题，才能理解危机的本质。

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这场危机的解决方案只能建立在美俄之间就欧洲安全架构达成一致的基础上。因为在这个问题上，美俄才是最重要的对话方。

许多欧洲国家缺乏战略眼光和责任感，许多领导人表现得咄咄逼人，情绪化严重，他们与经历过二战惨痛教训的前辈完全不同。过去的欧洲领导人清楚地知道，如果言辞和行动出错，战略决策失误，战争将带来何等巨大的灾难。但今天的欧洲政客，则更像是一群战略经验不足、极度情绪化、看不到自己行为后果的精英。

要在欧洲东部实现持久和平，美俄必须就行为准则达成共识。俄罗斯已经多次提出这一点，最近一次是在2021年12月。这种共识需要包括一个中立的、非军事化的乌克兰，这个乌克兰应当支持而非阻碍俄罗斯语言的使用，允许东正教基督徒自由信仰，允许民众祭奠在伟大卫国战争中牺牲的先辈。这不仅仅是象征性的行为，而是当前乌克兰国内重大的社会对抗问题。如果这个问题不被认真处理，它仍然可能成为导致乌克兰危机再次爆发的关键因素。

李泽西：您刚才谈到了欧洲安全架构的可能性，同时也提到了欧洲领导人心态上的问题。那么，您认为欧洲各国，尤其是欧盟，在未来的欧洲安全架构中应扮演什么角色？因为您刚才主要强调美俄之间的协议，那欧盟国家是否能在其中发挥作用？此外，您认为欧洲国家有没有可能改变其心态，与俄罗斯达成妥协？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：在类似当下的剧烈变动时期，保持战略自主和战略主权至关重要。这意味着，一个国家及其精英必须能够独立评估自身的核心利益，制定维护这些利益的策略，分配可用资源，衡量可以接受的风险，并确保这个决策过程是自主的。

但在当前的欧洲，很难找到真正独立思考的国家。也许唯一的例外是土耳其，部分土耳其领土位于欧洲，它是一个真正拥有主权的国家，能够自主思考自己的利益，并拥有支持这些利益的资源。土耳其有强大的武装力量，自己的武器制造体系，在这场危机中保持相对中立，并积极推动和平计划。

相较之下，英国、波兰、波罗的海国家以及斯堪的纳维亚国家的态度则极端好战、情绪化，缺乏战略思维深度。他们完全被特朗普推动与俄罗斯进行单独和平谈判的举动弄得措手不及。

目前，我看不到让这些国家参与谈判的必要。法、德、意、西等欧洲大国同样对这一情况感到震惊。他们至今尚未任命能够代表他们在乌克兰危机上谈判的特使。这让我想起2021年12月到2022年2月乌克兰危机爆发之初，美国在外交策略上完全压倒了这些欧洲国家，把它们裹挟进“乌克兰必胜”的项目中，几乎所有国家都被卷入其中，除了匈牙利等少数几个例外。

3月2日，十余个欧洲和欧盟国家，以及乌克兰和加拿大的领导人在英国伦敦举行峰会，就乌克兰危机和欧洲防务问题进行讨论新华社

没有任何欧洲国家问过：有哪些风险？这场冲突会有多昂贵？会持续多久？如果俄罗斯赢了怎么办？没人问这些问题，导致今天的欧洲国家陷入极为不利的局面。它们根本没有独立的外交立场，完全追随美国。这些国家过于情绪化，缺乏理性，因此无法进行严肃的和平谈判。

我希望未来他们能重新审视自己的战略思维，摆脱这种盲目、冲动的态度；尤其是那些在这场危机中损失最惨重的小国，比如芬兰。芬兰曾是一个中立国家，过去因与俄罗斯的关系而受益匪浅，作为俄罗斯与西方之间的桥梁，它在经济上获益良多。而如今，芬兰加入北约，关闭与俄罗斯的边界，这种战略决策的计算非常糟糕，政治代价高昂，经济已经陷入困境。

在这种情况下，俄方完全不理解这些国家为什么应该被允许坐上谈判桌。

李泽西：特朗普政府对欧采取更敌对的政策，特别体现于慕尼黑安全会议上JD·万斯的演讲。您认为这是否实际上是在帮助欧洲，迫使他们改变他们的态度？亦或者是，您认同大部分人的分析，即这是对欧洲价值观的全面攻击？无论美方初衷如何，您认为这是否能够真正促使欧洲采取行动，实现战略自主，并改变其整体战略思维？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：我不认为美国真正希望欧洲实现战略自主。他们仍然希望欧洲屈从于自己，希望欧洲继续追随美国精英的步伐。他们只是希望欧洲能够更加理性和现实，少一些情绪化和感性化。

欧洲被自己的意识形态蒙蔽了双眼，这种意识形态束缚了欧洲精英，使他们无法直面现实。例如，德国精英甚至不敢去质疑到底是谁炸毁了北溪管道，他们刻意回避这个问题，因为他们害怕真相可能会给他们带来极大的心理冲击。如果最终的答案是他们的盟友美国炸毁了北溪管道，那对美欧联盟关系来说将是毁灭性的打击。由于德国目前甚至不敢进行这样的讨论，我们为何要认为这样一个连合理问题都不敢提出的国家，有资格坐在谈判桌前？

美国副总统万斯在本届慕尼黑安全会议上发表讲话，大肆批评欧洲 央视新闻

李泽西：您认为美国真的希望欧洲变得更加理性吗？毕竟，正是过去“更感性”的欧洲，使自己完全依赖美国。站在特朗普政府的角度来看，他们为何要改变这种现状？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：他们希望欧洲精英更“志同道合”。美国政府将所谓的“全球主义精英”视为共同的敌人，这些人不从国家利益的角度思考问题，而是从跨国界的视角看待世界。特朗普视这类精英为自己的敌人，认为他们正在将各自国家引向错误的方向——去工业化、家庭价值观解体、军事危机加剧等。他希望在欧洲找到更加志同道合的合作伙伴。在我看来，这就是特朗普政府在慕尼黑安全会议上的意图。

李泽西：回到特朗普的外交政策。在美国，有两种主要理论解释他的策略：交易型，他希望从所有国家（包括盟友）身上榨取利益，认为盟友一直在占美国的便宜；亦或者全球秩序重塑，可能与中国、俄罗斯甚至其他国家一起划分势力范围。您认为哪种可能性更大？俄罗斯和中国应该如何应对这些可能性？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：特朗普的目标是最大化美国的国家实力。他认为，通过从盟友那里攫取利益，可以帮美国获取新的资源，扩张国家实力。他正在利用安全保障、金融控制、货币政策等工具，这些在过去被美国政府包装为“全球公共产品”。长期以来，美国一直向盟友灌输：这些是全球共同产品，是让大家共同繁荣的条件。

然而，特朗普的逻辑是：“不，这些不是全球公共产品，而是美国的工具。你们使用这些工具的代价不够高”。这包括：关于格陵兰岛、加拿大、巴拿马的讨论；控制欧洲的黄金储备（部分存放在美国）；迫使欧洲提高军费开支，并用这些资金购买美国武器；让欧洲增加对美国能源的购买量。特朗普在一定程度上正在消耗、蚕食盟友的资源，因为他理解，在当今大国竞争的环境下，他需要尽可能增强美国在亚洲的竞争优势；他认为主要竞争对手是中国。

在这种情况下，俄罗斯和中国应该继续坚持自上世纪90年代末以来的合作路径。1997年，中俄签署了《中俄关于世界多极化和建立国际新秩序的联合声明》，我们确立了一种不针对第三国的双边关系，目标是建立一个稳定的国际体系，使其足够强大，以防止美国等外部势力的干预。未来十到二十年，我们的核心任务是构建一个牢固的、不可被美国破坏的欧亚安全架构。

李泽西：俄罗斯的“欧亚安全架构”概念与中国的“全球安全倡议”有哪些共同点和潜在矛盾？我们应如何更好地融合这两个理念？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：最重要的共识是，俄罗斯和中国都认为外部势力不应干涉欧亚大陆事务。本地区的国家完全有能力处理自己的问题，无需像美国、英国这样的海洋国家实施“离岸制衡”策略，制造“颜色革命”，插手、破坏、煽动冲突等。这是中俄对欧亚大陆的共同愿景。

美国几个世纪以来一直通过分而治之的策略，在不同地区挑动国家间矛盾，成功地在欧亚大陆不同地区操纵强国与弱国的关系，使自己成为“不可或缺的调停者”。

中俄的联合努力应该致力于打破这种局面，使美国不再如此“不可或缺”，让欧亚大陆能够在没有外部势力干预的情况下，获得和平、稳定和繁荣。

李泽西：假设当前的和平谈判取得成功，乌克兰冲突在未来几个月内达成停火协议，您认为中俄关系将如何发展？两国的民间互动和公众舆论可能会在其中扮演怎样的角色？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：过去几年里，中俄关系大幅加强。我们正处于双边关系的巅峰时期，当前的任务是将这一基础打造成持久的合作模式，让中俄关系在21世纪迈向新的时代。

我相信这一定会发生。两国都具备坚定的政治意愿，也有坚实的经济基础。此外，我们还看到了两国人民之间的高度认同感，文化交流日益频繁，旅游往来不断增加，双方对彼此的历史和文化展现出极大兴趣。我们在文化领域的合作也越来越多，涵盖了电影、音乐、节庆活动等。比如，莫斯科已连续两年举办中国春节庆祝活动，这充分体现了中俄两国的深厚友谊。

我认为，乌克兰危机只是推动两国关系进一步深化的因素之一，但绝不仅限于此。中俄在21世纪肩负着共同建设安全、繁荣的欧亚大陆的使命。作为两大文明、两大邻国、两大强国，我们对彼此负有特殊责任，同时也承担着维护地区和平与稳定的重要职责。

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李泽西：美国国务卿马可·鲁比奥最近接受采访时表示，美国的战略并不是要分裂中俄，因为他认为这不太现实。他声称，特朗普政府的目标只是确保俄罗斯不会过度依赖中国。您怎么看待他的这一说法？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：我认为他清楚地知道中俄关系的独特性，外部势力无法拆散。俄罗斯认为，与中国开展合作符合其深远和全面的战略利益，反之亦然。美国理解这一点，因此他们的目标是试图降低中俄关系的战略性和重要性。但我不认为他们会成功。

中俄不仅是地理上的邻国，经济上也高度互补，两国经济体系都拥有对方所需要的资源和产品。此外，我们对21世纪全球格局的愿景也是一致的，即建立一个多极世界，让多个大国形成平衡，从而为国际体系制定稳定的架构，避免大规模危机的发生。

但与此同时，美国在太平洋地区的遏制政策已成定局。他们希望从欧洲撤出部分军事力量，集中力量围堵中国，其中一个目标是试图影响俄罗斯，使其减少对中国的支持。但我认为，这一企图不会成功。

李泽西：面对美国试图削弱中俄关系的举措，中俄应该如何应对？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：俄罗斯有自己的外交目标，并不会受制于美国的影响。俄美关系目前仍处于严重危机之中，我们还在恢复外交沟通的初级阶段，比如讨论如何归还被没收的俄方外交财产、恢复正常规模的外交人员配置，回到2016-2017年的水平。

美国现在能够影响俄罗斯的手段极其有限，这是因为拜登政府执政期间，美国对俄罗斯施加了数百项制裁，试图在乌克兰战场上使俄罗斯遭受“战略性失败”；美国尝试了各种手段动摇俄罗斯的核心利益，但最终收效甚微。我很难想象他们还能做些什么来迫使俄罗斯按照他们的意愿行事。

李泽西：我们之前主要讨论欧亚大陆的局势。但在乌克兰战争期间，俄罗斯大幅拓展了与全球南方的合作。假设乌克兰战事停火，俄罗斯与全球南方国家的合作会发生变化吗？这种合作又将如何与中国的全球南方外交策略交汇？

安德烈·苏申佐夫：需要明确的一点是，当前俄美谈判并不是因为俄罗斯改变了立场，并不是因为“俄罗斯认识到了错误”，而是因为美国认识到自己的错误，美国让俄罗斯在乌克兰遭受“战略性失败”的策略是错误的，甚至将世界推向了核战争的边缘。特朗普敢于承认，拜登政府、沙利文、布林肯等人的战略是错误的，他们让美国鲁莽地陷入了一场直接与俄罗斯对抗的危机。

而俄方的态度则是，俄罗斯对冲突演变的构想、目标的实现、对危机的战略判断是正确的；俄罗斯认为，21世纪的全球发展重心不在欧洲，而是在“世界多数”，即全球南方，在俄罗斯世界各地的盟友和伙伴。欧洲正处于政治混乱之中，他们不清楚自己的核心利益所在，甚至不敢提出关键问题，还在不断摸索自己的定位。尽管俄罗斯在文化上属于欧洲的一部分，但在战略和未来发展方向上，俄罗斯属于“世界多数”；“世界多数”正在迅速迈向繁荣，我相信俄罗斯的外交政策将继续深化这些俄罗斯耕耘了数十年的关系，尤其是在过去几年间。

安德烈·苏申佐夫在“2025·中俄三亚对话”北京对话

美国“联俄抗中”的企图注定难以实现。过去数年的实践已充分证明，美国难以真正影响俄罗斯的战略选择，俄罗斯也已并将继续深化与中国及广大全球南方国家的战略关系，因为这些国家正成为全球发展的新重心。中俄两国在经贸与文化领域的合作基础深厚，共同建设安全、繁荣的欧亚大陆的决心坚定。

以下为英文提要和采访原文：

Club Briefing: Andrey Sushentsov,  Head of the Department of International Relations at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), gave an exclusive interview to Beijing Club for International Dialogue in Sanya. He pointed out that the “White House disputes” reflect a shift in Ukraine’s position within U.S. strategy and highlight Trump’s realist stance on the Ukraine issue. In contrast, most European countries lack strategic foresight and are unqualified to sit at the negotiating table. In the future, the security landscape of Europe will largely be determined by the United States and Russia.

Sushentsov believes that the U.S. attempt to “align with Russia against China” is destined to fail. China and Russia have a solid foundation of cooperation in trade and culture and share the historic mission of building a secure and prosperous Eurasia. The past few years have fully demonstrated that the United States lacks the capability to truly influence Russia’s strategic choices. At the same time, Russia will continue to deepen its strategic ties with China and the broader Global South, as these nations are emerging as the new center of global development.

Jersey Lee

What's your reaction to what happened in the White House between Trump and Zelensky?

Andrey Sushentsov

Zelensky imagined himself as one of the great leaders of the west, like Winston Churchill or Charles De Gaulle, Franklin Roosevelt. And he tried to manipulate American administration into believing that Ukraine is not an instrument of American strategy, but a subject of a major geopolitical play, and can impose on americans its own designs on how the crisis can develop. Essentially, they have broken this standing at that meeting. Trump proclaimed that he wants to make peace. Zelensky tried to develop an idea that he wants to continue the war with American support, and he required the support in significant amount.

I think that symbolically, this is the end of the American strategy on supporting Ukraine as an instrument against Russia, and the beginning of a withdrawal of American strategic interests from the European continent.

Jersey Lee

What do you think of the mineral deal, and why did Trump propose it?

Andrey Sushentsov

United States under trump is trying to figure out how to extract value from the investments in Ukraine: political investments, military investments that the American administration have been following for several years, intensively for three last years, but for several decades prior to that, also.

Trump considers these investments, these political investments, as a setback for American interests, it drew United States into a significant military clash, indirect military clash with Russia, and cost Americans dozens of billions of dollars.

Trump is trying to figure out how exactly to extract similar amount of money out of the Ukrainian resources of any type, probably not specifically the rare earth minerals, there are not much of them in Ukraine. But he needs to show his audience, his electorate that he is fulfilling his pledge first to finish the war, and then to basically reimburse American budget on all the costs that Americans have been taking to support Ukraine in this crisis. He is trying to present a very swift success. He forced Zelensky, whom he blamed several times that he should step down, he's a dictator, his support rating is very low, that he basically has to do anything that United States tells him to do, to support his political lifeline.

Zelensky has a tough job to somehow not disappoint President Trump, but also not to do something that would be called a betrayal of national interest by the Ukrainians. And that's a tough spot. He is coming to Washington right now (this segment was recorded on Friday). It looks likely that the agreement is finished, because they would not meet otherwise if it's not finished. But let's see whether it would return the revenue for the American taxpayers, because extraction of materials from the Ukrainian soil will require peace, will require stability, will require predictable relations with Russia.

That is basically the prerequisite of any significant economic deals between Ukraine and anybody else.

Trump's instinct about reimbursing American expenses is very significant. He is trying to figure out how to do it properly. He has this major agreement with Ukraine, but maybe the extraction point would be not Ukraine per se, but some of the European or Global South companies that would come and would require American protection to fulfill some of the projects.

He is very experimental in his nature, and he likes to do things that have not been done previously. He doesn't follow the code in this respect. I think that he is creatively searching how exactly it can look like.

Jersey Lee

A primary Ukrainian concern for ceasefire negotiations is that, given the failure of the Budapest memorandum to actually support Ukraine today, it would need more ironclad security guarantees against future Russian advances.

What kind of security guarantees, from the Russian perspective, do you think would be appropriate and acceptable for Ukraine? On the other hand, what kind of security guarantees might Russia like from NATO and the West? Do you think they would be feasible in practice?

Andrey Sushentsov

The Budapest memorandum was a product of Ukraine agreeing on the removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory. They were never Ukrainian nuclear weapons. They were soviet nuclear weapons. Ukraine couldn't have navigated them separately without Moscow’s consent. And that was the point of agreement between the United States and Russia that the nuclear weapons should have been withdrawn, not only from Ukraine, but also from Belarus and Kazakhstan. It is incorrect to perceive the Budapest memorandum as somehow multilateral security guarantees, binding security guarantees from all of Ukraine’s neighbor and the United States.

What is more important, is that Ukraine crisis is not about Russia and Ukraine solely. It is primarily about Russia and NATO expansion to the east. It's not Russia that is coming closer to NATO’s border. It's NATO that is approaching Russia every year, through the color revolutions in the post-soviet space, in the overthrowing of the Yanukovich government in Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine has become a battleground between Russia and the West, and Ukrainian governments who opted on inviting western influence in Ukraine, who opted for the creation of a Western instrument out of Ukraine. Basically, they were the people who have prohibited any security guarantees to Ukraine, and that is the proper perspective to perceive these things.

The crisis can have its resolution if the United States and Russia would agree about the structure of security in Europe, because basically, they are the most important interlocutors on this matter.

A lot of European countries who are lacking strategic perspective and responsibility, many of them act very belligerently and unconsciously, they are not resembling their ancestors who witnessed the horrors of the second world war in Europe, and who had the sense of responsibility about what can come if you are wrong with words, if you are wrong with your actions, if you are wrong in your strategy, how difficult and tragic this war can look like.

Observing current European politicians, you just see a group of elites who are strategically inexperienced, very emotional and sentimental, and doesn't see the consequences of their actions.

For a durable peace to settle in the Eastern part of Europe, Russia and the United States have to agree on the rules of conduct. Russia has numerously spoken about those rules of conduct, the last time in December of 2021. This would require a neutral, demilitarized Ukraine that is supporting, not preventing, the use of Russian language in Ukraine, permits citizens of the Christian Orthodox church to follow their religion, permits them to worship the monuments of their fallen ancestors during the Great Patriotic War. That is not just a symbolic gesture, it's a matter of the significant civil resistance inside Ukraine currently. And if this issue is not being taken seriously, it would still be the most important question that could lead to another flare up of this Ukraine crisis.

Jersey Lee

You spoke a little about the possible European security architecture. You also mentioned issues with the mentality of European leaders. So number one, what role do you expect Europeans to play in this European security architecture? Specifically, the EU, because when you were talking about this issue, you were just talking about the US and Russia coming to an agreement. So does the EU countries have any role in this?

Also, do you expect them to change their mentality, to actually come to a compromise with Russia?

Andrey Sushentsov

In upheaval events like this, it's very important to maintain strategic autonomy and strategic sovereignty. This means that the country and elite should be able to independently assess what is its vital interests, how it can support them, what resources it can devote to support those interests, what kind of a risk it can adopt to fulfill its interests, how sovereign is this decision-making process.

It is hard for me to explain what part of Europe is currently sovereign, thinking independently on itself. I would probably say that Turkey, since part of it is in Europe, Turkey is a sovereign state. Turkey thinks about itself, about its interests. It has resources to support them, it has very able armed forces, it has its own significant arms programs, it is very active, it is quite neutral in this crisis, it proposes a peace settlement plan. Speaking about Great Britain, Poland, Baltic states, Scandinavia, we see a lot of belligerents, emotionality, sentiments, black and white thinking there. And they are caught by surprise by these Donald Trump movements to have a separate peace talks with Russia.

I don't see any interest on involving them in these negotiations right now. Bigger countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain also got caught by surprise on this. They have not yet appointed negotiator on their sides who can become a negotiator on the Ukraine crisis. It looks like the beginning of this crisis, December 2021, February 2022, when the United States outmaneuvered all of them, basically enrolled, mobilized all of the European countries into the project of Ukraine victory, and everybody, besides maybe little few like Hungary, everybody subscribed. Nobody has asked questions, what are the risks, how costly it can be, how lengthy it could be? What if Russia will win? Why has nobody asked those questions? And by doing so, European nations have currently put themselves in a very difficult position. They are not sovereign per se, they don't have a separate vision from the United States. They are too emotional and less rationalistic than they need to be to discuss proper peace material.

And I hope that in the future, they would reconsider this very emotional, blind attitude to their strategic thinking, particularly smaller countries that have suffered the most from this crisis like Finland, previously neutral country who have benefited from relations with Russia, heavily benefited being a bridge between Russia and the West, currently joining NATO, closing border with Russia, have significant costs for those political actions, strategically very poorly calculated actions. There’s currently a deadlock in its economy. And it is not clear for Moscow why exactly should these countries be present in the negotiation table.

Jersey Lee

Do you think that the Trump administration's more hostile approach towards Europe, exemplified by JD Vance speech at the Munich Security Conference, may actually be intended to help Europe change their attitude? Or was it simply, as most people interpreted it, a broad-based attack on European values? Regardless of whether it was intended to help the Europeans, do you think it would actually be able to jolt the Europeans into action or strategic autonomy, and changing their general strategic mentality?

Andrey Sushentsov

I don't think that the United States are interested in a strategically autonomous Europe. They like that they’re still being subdued by themselves. They want them to follow the elite of the United States. They just want Europe to be more rational and realistic and less emotional and less sentimental.

Europe is blindsided by its ideological drive, and it prevents European elites to see the reality. German elites forbid themselves to ask questions who exactly blew up the Nord Stream. They just stop themselves from asking these questions, because they don't want to be hurt by their answer. The answer can be so dramatic to them that it can traumatize them. What if our allies, the Americans, have blown up the Nord stream? And that is absolutely a devastating blow to the allied relations. Since this type of discussion is not possible currently in Germany, why should we consider that a country that stops itself from asking reasonable questions be present at the negotiation table?

Jersey Lee

Do you think that the US even wants a more rational Europe, since the previously “more emotional” Europe was also the one that made itself fully reliant on the US, so from the Trump administration's perspective, why would they want to change that?

Andrey Sushentsov

They want to have a more common-minded elite. They see a common enemy in the elites, which can be called a globalistic elite, that are thinking outside of the national borders, outside of the national interests. And Trump considers this type of elites as personal enemies. He thinks that those elites are leading their countries in the wrong direction, toward deindustrialization, toward family values that ruin societies, towards belligerent posture, military crisis, et cetera. He wants to have more common-minded partners in European elites. That's how I understand what they did at the Munich security conference.

Jersey Lee

Moving back to Trump's foreign policy approach. Right now, in America, there are two main theories for what he's trying to do. One is a transaction approach to extract benefits from everyone, including allies that are seen as freeloading off American goodwill and American support; another is that he wants to achieve a broader rethink of the global order, perhaps a move towards carving up the world into spheres of influence with China, Russia and perhaps other countries. Which one do you think is more likely? And also, how do you think Russia and China should respond to this new potential change?

Andrey Sushentsov

Trump is trying to multiply national power of the United States. He sees the new resource for multiplying its national power in extracting value from the allies. He is manipulating the instruments of security guarantees, of financial control, of monetary policy that were presented by previous American administration as common goods. The United States have usually been saying to allies, those are common goods. Those are basically the circumstances that permits everybody to prosper.

Now, Trump says, no, they are not common goods. They are our instruments, and you are not paying enough for using them. And his discussion about Greenland, about Canada, about Panama, about the European gold reserve, part of them are actually being held in the United States, about the European military expenditures that should be to a significant extent delivered to United States to buy new stocks of weapons, about European purchases of American energy, et cetera. He is trying, to some extent, to cannibalize allies, because he understands that in these new environments, where major powers operate in a competitive way, he needs to strengthen his hands in the competition in Asia. Primarily, he sees China as his competitor.

Russia and China in this situation should pursue the same routes our two countries have been following since the end of the 90s, when the joined Russia China chapter on multipolarity, a new world order was signed in 1997, where we establish new type of relations not directed against third countries, aimed at establishing a stable international structure that is sustainable enough to avoid interference from a country like United States. Our major task for the upcoming decade or two is to build a security architecture in Eurasia that is durable and unalterable by the United States.

Jersey Lee

What are some commonalities and potential contradictions between Russia's concept of Eurasian Security Architecture with China's Global Security Initiative? How can we better mesh the two ideas?

Andrey Sushentsov

The most important similarity is that Russia and China see that external influence in Eurasia is unnecessary, that local powers can fix local problems. We do not need any maritime power like United States or Great Britain or anybody else to meddle in regional affairs, trying to offshore balance parties, trying to stage color revolutions, disrupt, seed conflicts, et cetera. That is the basis of the common vision of Russia and China on what should our continent look like. Americans for centuries have been delivering a strategy of dividing and conquering separate powers in different regions. We see that they are successfully balancing weaker and stronger countries in different parts of Eurasia, making themselves somehow indispensable.

The joint efforts of Russia and China should be to make the United States not that indispensable, that we can bring peace, stability, and prosperity to our home continent, Eurasia, without any external interference.

Jersey Lee

Let's assume that the current negotiations are successful and a ceasefire eventually comes in the coming months to Ukraine. How do you think Russia, China ties will evolve? What role might the people to people and public opinion in both countries play?

Andrey Sushentsov

Russia and China have dramatically strengthened their relations throughout several past years. We are probably experiencing the apex of our bilateral relations, and we should put all efforts to make this durable foundation of the new era of the Russia and China relations in the 21st century.

I'm sure that it will happen. We have a proper political will on both sides. We have a very strong economic foundation for this. We have great affinity between peoples of our countries, we see a significant number of cultural exchanges and tourist visits, we see a great interest in history and culture of both countries, we see a significant cooperation in the cultural field, in cinema, in music and festivals. Moscow, for the second year in a row, is celebrating Chinese New Year, and it's a very a brilliant manifestation of the friendship between our two countries.

I am sure that Ukrainian crisis is just one point that made those relations very specific, but it's not the only one. We have a common destiny on making Eurasia safe and prosperous in the 21st century. As two great nations, two great civilizations, two great neighbors, we have a special responsibility towards one another, and toward peace and stability on our continent.

Jersey Lee

In a slightly earlier interview, US Secretary of state Marco Rubio said that US strategy is not intended to split Russia and China, which he believes is not likely to succeed, but that the Trump playbook is merely to make sure that Russia isn't dependent on China. What's your thoughts on his remarks?

Andrey Sushentsov

I think he understands that Russia and China relations are unique in nature and cannot be split by any third country, that Russia has a deep and comprehensive interest in developing understanding with China and vice versa. They understand that they would like to find ways to make Russia-Chinese relation less strategic, less important. And I don't think that they would be successful in it, because they’re two great neighbors and two nations with compatible economies. Both economies have a lot of materials and products that are required by the partner economy. Russia and China also develop a common vision for the 21st century as a polycentric system where several different major power gravity centers compete in a way that is structuring the system and prevents significant crisis.

But it's clear that the Americans are intending to develop the containment policy toward China in the Pacific Ocean. They want to withdraw some of their forces from Europe and concentrate on this task of containing China. And one of their aims is to influence Russia in a way that Russia would be less supportive toward China, but I don't think that they would succeed in it.

Jersey Lee

How can Russia and China respond to these attempts by the US to split the two countries?

Andrey Sushentsov

Russia has its own goals and designs in the relations with the United States. They are still in a very significant crisis. We are only beginning excavation process of those relations. We are discussing how diplomatic property can return, how the diplomatic staff can be enlarged to the proper levels they have been since 2016, 2017. There are very limited instruments of American influence over Russia. This is due to the legacy of the Biden administration, hundreds of sanctions imposed on Russia, attempts to inflict Russia's strategic defeat in Ukraine. I think Americans tried everything to affect Russia's interest, to no results essentially. It's very hard for me to figure out what they can do to force Russia to do what they want.

Jersey Lee

We've been focusing mostly on Eurasia, but throughout the Ukraine war, Russia has made moves to dramatically expand its engagement with the Global South. Again, assuming that the Ukraine war comes to a ceasefire, will this engagement be changed in any way? How will this intersect with China's approach towards the Global South countries?

Andrey Sushentsov

What is important is that current negotiations between Russia and United States are happening, not because Russia has changed its course, not because it recognized that it was wrong. No. United states have recognized that they were wrong, that their strategy on inflicting strategic defeat on Russia is wrong, that brought the world to the edge of the nuclear war. Donald Trump had the courage to claim that Biden’s strategy, Sullivan, Blinken, all those guys, they were wrong. They were driving United States recklessly into direct crisis, direct confrontation with Russia.

And Moscow says that Russia's vision on the development of this crisis, on the achievements of its goals was proper, that Russia was correct in its assessments, which was that a foundation for the development of the 21st century lies not with Europe, but with the Global Majority countries, or Global South, with Russia's allies and partners in different parts of the world. Europe is in political shambles. Europe doesn't know where its heart lies, don't know where its interests lie, it cannot permit itself to ask important questions, it is still searching for itself. And even though Russia is culturally European, it sees that, in terms of the strategy and its future, Russia belongs to a developing Global Majority that is swiftly moving toward prosperity. I'm sure that Russian foreign policy would be aimed at strengthening all those ties that Russia has been building for several decades, particularly in the last few years.