【文/ 马丁·雅克】

我很高兴能够在今年的思想者论坛上发表自己的观点。这是我第三次参加这个论坛。我对思想者论坛有着很美好的回忆，我非常喜欢论坛的活动。举办这样一个论坛是个非常好的想法，但这次，我最终只能以视频形式参会，这太令人遗憾了，因为我将无法聆听其他发言者的想法和讨论。

英国剑桥大学政治和国际研究系高级研究员马丁·雅克

西方的衰落仍在继续。事实上，在过去5年里，西方的衰落加速了。特朗普就任总统严重损害了美国的全球声誉，并使外界质疑美国是否仍会信守承诺，扮演好自己自1945年后一直在扮演的全球角色。

纵观过去一个世纪，现在的美国处于更加分裂和对立的阶段。在最近一次美国总统大选中，美国的政治精英越来越怀疑美国的民主、国家的统一以及西方联盟的未来。这是一种非同寻常的情况，几乎没有人在2016年初会预料到这种情况。

美国对疫情的处理是灾难性的，有超过75万人死亡。美国的经济遭受严重损失。美国还发现自己正处于一场日益严重的生存危机中，他们感觉自己被削弱，变得更分裂、更孤立、更不受尊重。

许多人怀着不祥的预感期待着下一次总统选举。特朗普或其同类会再次当选总统吗？毫无疑问，只有一个问题会让美国人团结一致——中国是美国的敌人，是对美国全球霸权的威胁。

欧洲开始越来愈疏远美国，这是自1945年冷战以来的长期趋势，但在特朗普执政时这种疏远更加严重了。特朗普执政大大恶化了欧洲人对美国的看法。而就欧洲来说，欧洲经济衰退得甚至比美国更严重。

美欧作为西方的两大支柱，它们的经济都开始走弱，彼此之间的关系也日益疏远。然而，有一件事，他们基本上观点一致，那就是中国对西方构成威胁——随着默克尔的离任和德国新政府的上任，这一立场在欧盟层面得到了强化。

2021年9月7日，德国总理默克尔在德国国会下院柏林议院会议期间离开了全体会议厅。来源：金融时报

我们难以想象西方能继续保持其全球优势。美国经济已不足以支撑这一优势了。相对而言，美国的贸易水平已经大幅收缩。美国的负债则意味着它越来越无力为达成本国的目标而进行融资，例如向“一带一路”的竞争项目进行投资。

目前，美元仍维持世界储备货币的地位，但这仅仅是因为目前还没有其他选择。那么到2035年，还会如此吗？美国此前有能力通过威胁将其他国家排除在全球金融体系之外来将自己的意愿强加给其他国家，当中国经济规模是美国的两倍左右且数字货币广泛使用时，当美元不再是世界储备货币时，美国的这一能力会大幅减弱。这一刻将标志着美利坚治世的终结。

与此同时，西方秩序的萎靡不振在东亚、非洲、拉丁美洲、欧洲和世界各地都很明显。这不仅仅是涉及中国，还涉及土耳其、俄罗斯和印度等地区大国的崛起，这些国家也在填补美国衰落留下的真空。我们是否已经生活在“后西方时代的世界”？我们当然正在向这样一个世界过渡。这是一个复杂和多层面的进程。在某些方面，我们差不多已经做到了。但在其它方面，我们还没有。在涉及到像国际货币基金组织和世界银行这样的全球性机构时，答案是我们还没有。

但就全球贸易体系而言，西方霸权正在迅速衰退。这就是为什么特朗普试图破坏或边缘化世贸组织。美国试图在美英欧之间建立跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP）和跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（TTIP），但这一企图流产了。美国现在没有加入东亚的三大贸易协定，即区域全面经济伙伴关系协定 (RCEP)、全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定 (CPTPP)和“一带一路”倡议。

2015年，比利时人权联盟呼吁立即暂停TTIP谈判。来源：Global Justice Now

曾经全球适用的西方体系正变得支离破碎，正被区域体系补充或取代，而美国往往不在其中。西方时代的落幕并不预示着中华治世 (Pax Sinica)的到来，这主要是因为中华治世和美利坚治世（Pax Americana）在概念上根本不一样。实际上，中国治世将很不同。举例来说，中国将与发展中国家发展密切和特殊的关系。这种关系将不会像美式霸权那样要求政治服从和整齐划一。

而且，中国不会在全世界建满军事基地，也不会像美国那样倚重军事实力。中美治世的结构背景也大不相同。毕竟，这不仅是中国崛起的时代，也是发展中世界崛起的时代。发展中世界拥有世界85%的人口，而中国正试图推出一种新的全球治理模式。中华治世将与我们此前经历的美利坚治世和不列颠治世在很多方面都不相同。我预计西方时代的终结将伴随着一段漫长的过渡期，会有很多来自发展中国家的新角色出现，它们将在这一复杂而全新的全球治理模式中扮演越来越重要的角色。

但我们现在还没有达到这个阶段。我们离目标还是很远，甚至还没能触碰到它。现在西方可能正在衰落，但百足之虫，死而不僵。事实上，自2017年特朗普开始攻击中国以来，西方已经获得了某种新生。美国对中国的声讨能够在西方以及其它地区（如印度）得到如此广泛、普遍的支持，这点让我感到震惊。

美国对中国的“邪恶十字军”。来源：project syndicate

在我的国家英国，对中国的看法已经发生了根本性的变化。在2000年到2016年这段时期，人们对中国产生了一种新的、广泛的好奇心，这种好奇心建立在中国超出寻常的经济增长和大规模脱贫的基础上，而且人们还相信中国可以为西方国家提供新的机会。而现在，人们的对华情绪已全面转负。

现在，中国被认为是专制、不民主、不可信、扩张主义的、神秘的、封闭的，被视作是对西方及其生活方式的威胁。欧洲虽说对华抱有这种负面情绪，但远远不及美国那么严重，但也不应被低估。

让我举一个例子来说明这种态度的转变。在2000年至2016年甚至更长一段时期，人们试图了解中国，对中国历史和文明的兴趣日益浓厚。而现在，人们几乎只关注1949年之后的中国历史，绵延两千多年的中国历史在他们眼里已经消失了。中国被简化为中国共产党，而中国共产党又被等同于苏联共产党。中国自2000年以来取得的很多成就都已经不复存在了。更糟糕的是，情况甚至发生了倒退。现在有时感觉有点像冷战。

那为什么会出现这种转变？在美国发生这种转变是不可避免的。因为一旦美国意识到，希望中国变得像西方一样只是一种幻觉的话，那么随着中国的不断崛起和发展，美国开始将中国视为对其全球霸权的致命威胁。

我们不应该轻描淡写中国崛起对美国的意义。“成为头号国家”这种意识已渗透进了美国的DNA，这就是为什么新的反华运动成了美国的朝野共识。中国现在被认为是对美国生存的致命威胁，但欧洲不认为中国是对欧洲霸权的威胁，因为在1945年之后，欧洲就放弃了自己的霸权野心。

尽管如此，欧洲仍然深受美国的影响，他们一起参加了冷战，并且在很大程度上分享着共同的历史和文化。欧洲殖民了美国，是欧洲人的祖先创造了美国。因此，尽管美欧关系自冷战后越来越疏远，但它们仍然有许多共同点。而中国则与西方有着截然不同的文化和历史。

更复杂的是，过去中国在西方眼里等于透明，直到最近几十年，中国成了街区里新出现的人物。在中美关系下滑阶段，中国在许多方面都加强了自身实力，包括经济增长、技术创新、出色地控制住了疫情，并且与许多伙伴国巩固了双边关系。

中国经济增长趋势

但可以肯定的是，中国与西方的关系出现了严重的倒退。该如何扭转这种局面？最重要而且迄今为止最困难的问题是，西方根本不了解中国为何不同，以及到底哪里不同。

要解决这个问题没有捷径可走，只有想办法向西方公众解释中国，教给他们有关中国的知识，这是一个漫长的过程。随着中国的崛起，西方人有义务必须去更多地了解中国，但这一过程并不总是一帆风顺。因为人们对中国怀有疑虑、恐惧和偏见。原因之一是中国的巨大体量。中国对此无能为力，只能时刻注意西方的这种忧虑。在我看来，邓小平有关“韬光养晦”的建议就与这个问题相关。尽管“韬光养晦”是为一个完全不同的时代构想的，但它含有适用于任何时代的真理内涵。中国体量巨大这一事实将永远是其他国家焦虑的根源。

我想说的第二点是关于中国如何与世界沟通。在过去5年中，中国应对西方攻击的许多对策都不是很有效，有时我甚至担心会适得其反。中国这些应对措施的主要受众是谁？有时感觉受众是西方政治领导人和媒体，有时又感觉是中国人，而不是其他国家的国民。这是个大误会。受众不应该是西方的执政精英。这是外交层面的问题。重要的是，受众必须是更广大的西方民众。这就需要采用不同的表达方式和语调，凝聚共识，展开对话，不要太正式，要接地气，要做自我批评，要求同存异，不能死板或好斗。也许我们可以从Tik-Tok在西方的成功中学到点什么。我当然不是建议机械地模仿，而是做个比喻。在想象力方面，中国需要采用不同的语调来吸引西方受众。这意味着中国需要学习和借鉴年轻一代的影响力方式，而不能有官僚习气，这会疏远西方受众。中国可以做到这一点，我们只需要认识到采取不同策略的重要性和紧迫性。

最后我想说的是，中国需要更加开放。这是一个改革开放的时代。开放不仅仅关乎经济，也关乎文化。在西方人的观念中，中国现在太封闭，还不够开放，太过神秘。我理解出现这种情况的历史根源。当然，如何对外交流是中国的内政。但随着中国成为世界大国，全世界人民都理所当然地期望中国更加开放，中国变得负责任和更开放是其进一步获得权力和影响力所需付出的必要代价。

非常感谢。祝此次论坛圆满成功。

It's my great pleasure to be invited to make a few remarks to this year's thinkers’ forum. I have the fondest memories of the thinkers. I think this is the third one I've attended, and I've hugely enjoyed all of them. It's a great idea. But at last, I only appear in the form of a video, much to my regret because I won't be able to listen to the other speakers and the discussion. The west decline has continued. Indeed, over the last 5 years, it has accelerated the trump presidency, seriously damaged America's reputation worldwide, and brought a commitment to its post-1945 global role into question.

America is now more deeply divided and polarized at any stage during the last century. Before the last presidential election, they were growing doubts among its political elites and more widely about the future of American democracy, the country's unity, and the end of the western alliance. It was an extraordinary situation that hardly anyone would have predicted. In the early two thousand and sixteen, its handling of the pandemic has been disastrous, with over 3/4 of a million people dead and its economy suffering badly. America finds itself in a growing existential crisis, weakened, divided, were isolated, less respected. Many look forward to the next presidential election with a sense of foreboding. Could trump or someone of his elk elect? No one question unites Americans that China is the enemy and a threat to America's position. Europe is now more detached from the united states as the global hegemony. Then at any time since 1945, this has been a long term trend since the cold war. Still, it significantly accelerated, joining the trump presidency, which did massive damage to how Europeans perceived us for its part. Europe's economic decline has been even more dramatic than America's and Europe.

Twin pillars of the West have thrust, have thus grown, economically weaker, and increasingly estranged from each other. There is one thing. However, they largely agree upon the belief that China represents a threat to the West, a stance that could be strengthened in the EU context by the departure of Merkel and the arrival of a new German government. It is inconceivable the West can maintain its global ascendancy. The US economy is no longer strong enough to support it. Its trading footprint has contracted considerably in relative terms. Its indebtedness means that it is less and less able to finance its desired objectives, such as funding a rival to belt and road.

For now, the dollar retains its position as the world's reserve currency, but only because there is no alternative. Will that still be true in 2035? When the Chinese economy is likely to be roughly double the size of US economy and with digital currencies widespread, when the dollar is no longer the world's reserve currency, the ability of the us to impose its will on other countries by threatening their exclusion from the global financial system will be sharply reduced. This moment will mark the symbolic end of pax-Americana.

Meanwhile, the wilting of the western order is evident around the world in east Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and elsewhere. This is not only about China. It is also about the rise of regional powers, such as turkey, Russia, and India, which are also filling the vacuum created by America's decline. Are we already living in a post-western world? We are certainly transitioning to one. It is a complex and multifaceted process. In some respects, we are already more or less there. In others, not yet. When it comes to global institutions, like the IMF and the world bank, the answer is not yet. But as far as the global trading system is concerned, western hegemony is in rapid retreat. That is why trump sought to undermine and sideline the WTO. The trading packs that America sought to create - the TPP and the TTIP between the us and the UK and the EU - proved abortive. The US is outside the three main trading agreements in east Asia, namely the RCEP, the CPTPP, and the belt and road.

The once near-universal western system is fragmenting and being supplemented or replaced by regional systems, often without the united states. The passing of the western era will not herald the arrival of Pax-Sinica, not least because the notion of Pax Sinica suggest that it will be in the same vein as pax Americana. In fact, it will be very different. It will, for example, be rooted in a close and special relationship with the developing world. It will not require political obedience and homogeneity in the manner of US hegemony. And it will not ring the world with military basis or place anything like the same emphasis on military power. The structural context will also be very different. This is, after all, the era, not just of China's rise, but that of the developing world, which is home to 85 % of the world's population, and which China seeks to enfranchise in a new model of global governance. The latter will be very different for many things we have seen previously, the Pax-Americana or Pax-Britannica. I expect the demise of the western era to be followed by a prolonged period of transition with many new actors from the developing world, playing an increasingly central role in what will be a complex and very new kind of global governance.

But this is to get ahead of ourselves. We are nowhere near this. We cannot even touch it. We can barely imagine it. So let us return to the here and now. The West may be in decline. But it is far from dead and buried. Indeed, as I've already alluded to, the West has gained a certain new lease of life since trump's assault on China from 2017 onwards. Indeed, I have been struck by the ability of what started off as an American crusade against China to mobilize wider generalized support in the West and well beyond - India is a case in point. The perception of China in my own country, the UK, has changed fundamentally. The period between 2000 and 2016, roughly speaking, saw a new and widespread curiosity about China, based on the latter’s extraordinary growth and poverty reduction, together with the belief that China could offer new opportunities for western countries. That mood has given way to dominant negativity towards China.

China is now seen as a threat to the West and its way of life as autocratic, undemocratic, untrustworthy, expansionist, secretive, closed. This negativity is not nearly as strong in Europe as it is in the united states, but nor should it be underestimated. Let me give you one example of this shift in attitudes. Between 2000 and 2016, perhaps longer than that, there was a growing interest in Chinese history and Chinese civilization in trying to understand China. Now China is seen almost solely in terms of its history since 1949. Two thousand years of Chinese history have disappeared. China is reduced to the Chinese communist party, which is seen, in turn, as synonymous with the soviet communist party. Many of the gains since 2000 have been lost. Worse, we have even gone backwards. It feels at times a bit like the cold war.

So why the shift? The shift in America was inevitable. Once The US came to realize that its hopes of China becoming like the West were an illusion, then as China continued to rise and spread its wings, the US came to see China as a deadly threat to its global hegemony. We should not underplay what this means in America. Being number one is part of its DNA; that is why the new anti-China crusade is bipartisan and consensual. China is now considered a mortal threat to America's very being. Europe is different. It does not see China as a threat to its hegemony, because it abandoned its hegemonic aspirations after 1945.

Nevertheless, Europe remains heavily influenced by America. They fought the cold war together. They share in very degrees bit,  most of all much history and culture. Europeans colonized America, and their ancestors created the united states. So despite the growing distance between Europe and us since the cold war, they still have much in common, certainly compared with China, which, as we know, has a profoundly different culture and history.

And a further complicated fact is that China has been largely invisible to westerners until really, very recently that last several decades, as it were a new kid on the block. During the downturn in US-China relations, China has strengthened its position in many respects, its economic growth, technological innovation, its brilliant handling of the pandemic, and the consolidation of its relationship with many of its partners.

But certainly, in its relations with the West, there have been serious setbacks. How can these be reversed? The most important and by far the most difficult problem is the fundamental ignorance in the West about why and how China is so different. Here there are no shortcuts, only the long game to find ways explaining and educating the Western public about China. True. There is a certain force in my European play. As China rises, westerners are obliged to learn more about China. But as we have seen, this process is not always smooth. It can provoke a backlash because people harbour doubts, fears, and prejudices about China. One of these is the sheer size and scale of China. There is nothing that China can do about this, except always be aware and conscious of this concern, a nervousness. In my view, Deng Xiaoping’s advice about keeping a low profile is relevant to this problem. Although keeping a low profile was conceived for a very different era, it contains a kernel of truth for all times. The fact that China is so big will always be a source of anxiety for other countries.

The second point I would make is how China communicates with the world. Many of China's attempts to deal with the western assault on China over the last 5 years have been ineffectual. And sometimes, I'm afraid, even counterproductive. Who is the audience? It often appears to be western political leaders and the media. Sometimes it feels as if it might even be aimed at a Chinese rather than an international audience. This is misconceived. The audience should not be the western governing elites. That is for diplomacy. But crucially, the audience must be the broad western public. This requires a different tone and style, engaging consensus, conversational, informal, streetwise, self-critical, seeking common ground, not wooden or belligerent. Perhaps we can learn something here from the runaway success of Tik Tok in the West. Not literally. I wouldn't suggest that. But metaphorically. And in terms of imagination, China needs a different tone to appeal to western audiences. This is where China should draw on a younger generation of influences and methods, rather than officialdom, which is too remote from western audiences. China can do this. It just needs to recognize the importance, urgency even of a different approach.

One final point, if I may, China needs to be more open. This is the era of reform and opening up. Opening up cannot just be about economics. It is also cultural. To western perceptions, China is too closed, insufficiently open, too secretive. Now I understand absolutely the historical roots of this. But secrecy can easily engender suspicion. It is justified on the grounds that issuing question is an internal matter for China. But, as China becomes a great power, people around the world will reasonably expect China to be more open about itself and its problems and difficulties. Accountability and openness are necessary prices of power and influence. Thank you very much. And I wish the forum great success.

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