编者按：世界知名的Munk Debate（芒克辩论会）日前播出了芒克辩论会主席、加拿大著名主持人鲁德亚德·格里福茨（Rudyard Griffiths）和清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波的对话。双方就台湾问题为何是中国的首要安全关切、中国与其他亚洲国家的南海争端，以及乌克兰冲突的经验教训等进行了深度讨论。

北京对话（Beijing Club for International Dialogue）对此进行实录翻译，以飨读者。

【翻译：李泽西 核译：韩桦】

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：周波，欢迎来到芒克对话。

周波：你好，很高兴参加对话。

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：您是否认为台湾日益不确定的地位是中国目前最大的国家安全关切？

周波：台湾问题一直是中国最大的国家安全关切。原因其实很简单：对于世界上所有国家的军队来说，领土和国防都是头等大事。中国的不同之处在于，作为一个大国，我们还肩负着其他一些使命。中国的角色非常独特。首先，作为一个大国，却还没有统一，这在大国中极为罕见。此外，中国要走出去，在海外有很多利益，因此我们谈论的是一个如此复杂的大国。

对于大陆中国人来说，希望与台湾和平统一是一种自然而然的情感。接下来的问题是：首先，中国大陆是否正在失去耐心？这其实是一个很重要的问题。我想说，我们仍然是有耐心的。比如，2022年10月的中共二十大，习近平主席谈到台湾问题时指出“我们坚持以最大诚意、尽最大努力争取和平统一的前景”。  

南希·佩洛西在此之前窜访台湾时，中国大陆军队在台湾岛周围进行了大规模演习，实弹发射导弹等等。当蔡英文在加州会见麦卡锡时，我们又进行了演习，但这次演习只是模拟攻击，没有使用实弹。这极其微妙，说明我们知道如何处理这种情况，我们的措施是谨慎和有分寸的。

佩洛西2022年8月窜访台湾后，解放军在台湾岛周边进行军演（图源：新华社）

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：美国越来越多地向台湾提供尖端武器系统，尤其是承诺提供地对海导弹，中国大陆的国家安全部门对此怎么看？美国的这些行动是否被视为挑衅行为，或者只是被视为一种滋扰，与过去的举动无异，因此中方也不会比过去格外重视？

周波：我认为这些举动肯定被认为具有挑衅性，但问题是，它们影响到底有多大？我不认为美方的这些举措会有什么了不起。

比如，台湾最近制造了首艘本土潜艇，今后一共再制造大约八艘。但这些潜艇对整体局势有多大影响呢？根据我作为军人的经验，我知道潜艇比飞机要复杂得多。我来自空军，虽然不是飞行员，但我知道，飞机通常只有在飞行员驾驶多年后才能在技术上完善。这意味着它被生产出来，首先要通过试飞，最后，只有飞行员本人才能告诉你到底存在哪些问题。

因此，我相信台湾自己制造的第一艘潜艇肯定存在很多问题。实际上，它的交付过程仓促，因为蔡英文希望这能够成为她的政治遗产。即使他们能顺利制造8艘潜艇，这又有多大影响？这确实可能会使解放军的决策变得复杂，但总的来说，对于正在突飞猛进发展的中国军队而言，这些都微不足道。

我认为美国现在采取的战略是把台湾变成一只“豪猪”。但美国真的相信台湾能变成一只强大的“豪猪”吗？我对此表示怀疑。但这符合美国的利益，表明他们支持所谓的民主，也符合美国军工企业出售武器的利益，谁会拒绝这样一个大发横财的机会呢？我认为，在日益复杂的中美关系中，美国只是将台湾视作一个讨价还价的筹码。

我认为，美国实际上已经从失败中吸取了教训，做了一定的改变。例如，脱钩现在看起来完全是无稽之谈，美国选择改用“去风险”的说法，其实是借用欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩的说法。但他们为什么称之“去风险”呢？因为“去风险”听起来比较温和，而脱钩显然是不可能的。那“去风险”又是什么意思呢？我认为他们必须扪心自问。即便是在半导体和芯片领域去风险，也是愈发困难的事情。这并非中方的要求，而是芯片制造商们正在失去中国市场，是他们在向白宫施压。

我认为，美国对于“一个中国”政策其实是有很多不同意见的。美国外交关系委员会前主席理查德·哈斯（Richard Haas）写过一篇文章，谈到美国的对华政策应该从战略模糊转向战略清晰。但也有其他学者并不同意他的观点，因为这种清晰战略可能会让局势变得更加危险。

为什么会出现这种争论呢？我认为这是源自中国不断增强的实力。在过去，中国实力不够，当美国保持政策模糊时，大家就得猜测他们的真实立场。但是，由于中国的实力不断增强，美国担心除非他们明确表示会在军事上保卫台湾，否则大陆很可能会首先对台湾进行打击。但如果美国转向战略清晰，有些人又担心这会主动招来大陆“先发制人”。因此，美国现在陷入了进退两难的境地。

再看看美国国内的情况。拜登政府软弱无力，两党极端对立。从经济方面看，拜登政府做得不错，但你听听特朗普描述的美国，可谓“尸横遍野”。而在全球范围，“自由民主”制度已经持续衰落了17年。这是谁造成的？显然，这与中国或俄罗斯无关。对于像我这样的中国人，或任何人来说，看到美国总统呼吁抗议者占领国会山是令人震惊的。这太不可思议了，类似事情甚至不会发生在非洲。因此，我对美国能否在台湾问题上采取稳定的对华政策没有多大的信心。

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：你提到了美国政界的争论；一些共和党人认为美国应该向台湾提供明确的安全保证，类似于北约内部的第5条承诺。如果这一提议发生，中方会如何反应？这会被视为挑衅吗？

周波：我们先来看看关于“一个中国”政策的争论，或者说关于战略模糊与战略清晰的争论。最终，他们还是说“一个中国”。为什么呢？因为他们虽然在掏空这个概念，但是仍然将它视为一个大筐，这样对他们自己更为有利，可以从各种不同角度解释什么是“一个中国”。如果他们放弃“一个中国”，那当然对他们和我们来说都是地动山摇。

我认为可以从佩洛西窜访台湾的过程看出中国大陆的决心。有人问我，如果美国众议院新议长“访问”台湾，会发生什么？我说，我不知道，我们当然会有多个备案计划，但凭我的直觉猜测，我们的反应必定更强烈。否则，我们如何告诉自己，我们在做正确的事？

我不认为他们真的会以这种方式公然支持“台独”，但我完全相信，不断强大起来的中国大陆有更多的手段来处理这个问题。

1月15日，台湾大选刚刚结束第二天，太平洋岛国瑙鲁同台湾“断交”

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：美国对台姿态的争论，也涉及到美国的南太平洋战略的大背景，即"奥库斯"（AUKUS）。围绕这一战略，美国正努力与日本、菲律宾，以及一定程度上与韩国发展更紧密的安全关系。中国安全部门对此有何看法？是否有一种被“步步紧逼”的感觉，是否有一种对手在一致反对中国崛起、中国扩张的感觉？

周波：让我先谈谈美国的大战略。我认为，美国把重点放在亚太地区，或者美国人所谓的印太地区，实际上反映出美国的实力确实在下降。美国官员经常谈论盟友和伙伴的重要性，因为单靠他们自己的力量是不够的，必须依靠这些盟友和伙伴。

你提到了各方和各种不同的情况。我认为，总体而言，这是美国尝试在该地区遏制中国。问题是，在我阅读了美国的印太战略之后，我发现他们目标很多，但工具不够。

没有哪个国家蠢到选择非黑即白。我认为，世界已经进入到了一个所有国家都在就事选边、而不是就边选边的时代。说到日本，如果台湾海峡发生冲突，日本有条约义务在后勤补给方面支持美国，日本不得不这样做。

至于澳大利亚，现在还很难说。不到最后一刻，你无法知道一个人到底会怎么做。如果你研究一下澳大利亚的历史，会发现这个国家非常有趣，它总是在其他地方打别人的仗，在土耳其的加利波利、阿富汗或远离澳大利亚大陆的某地，只有二战期间日本轰炸达尔文，使澳大利亚本土直接受到战争影响。

但现在，澳大利亚1/3的出口都流向了中国。他们确实正在购买八艘潜艇，但这些潜艇影响又有多大呢？就像台湾的潜艇一样，它们可能会使中国政府的决策变得更加复杂，但这并不是多大事，因为就舰艇数量而言，我们已经是世界上最多的国家了。这八艘潜艇需要至少十几年才能完成交付，届时中国人民解放军肯定会变得更加强大。我认为这与莫里森政府有很大关系。现在，阿尔巴尼政府在进行一些改变。因此，整个局势并非非黑即白。

菲律宾的情况很有意思，因为马科斯总统的对华政策似乎与其前任大相径庭。我仔细想过，到底为什么会这样呢？杜特尔特总统本人也支持对菲律宾有利的南海仲裁案裁决，但他采取友华态度显然使菲律宾得到许多好处。不过杜特尔特并不经常提及南海问题，他选择为了其他利益而与中国保持良好关系。

但说到马科斯总统，我就很难理解了。我认为这可能与他的个人背景有关，因为他与美国的联系比较紧密。而基本上所有菲律宾高级军官都或多或少有过美国培训经历。不过，这其实还是说不通，因为中国从未威胁过要对南海的任何声索国使用武力。

在台湾问题上，中国制定了可能采取非和平手段的三个前提条件。但在南海问题上，中国从未威胁过任何其他国家。因此，我很难理解菲律宾政府为什么突然放开九个基地供美国使用，这其实是说不通的。事实上，这会让菲律宾面临更加危险的局面，因为如果美国人把这些基地用作前沿阵地，那么菲律宾的国土当然就会成为打击目标，这符合菲律宾的利益吗？

菲律宾原美军基地与去年新设美军基地对比图（图源：《日经亚洲》）

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：中国领导人从乌克兰战争中汲取了哪些经验？有一种观点认为，普京之所以入侵乌克兰，部分原因是他认为北约和西方国家在武装乌克兰，支持不符合俄罗斯利益的政治运动和人物，而由于乌克兰靠近莫斯科和俄罗斯的其他决策中心，以至于乌克兰成为俄罗斯的安全隐患。中国是否担心，乌克兰出现的这些情况可能在台湾或南海地区重现，东欧的历史有可能在亚洲重演？

周波：就乌克兰战争而言，如果两年前的普京能够预知未来，我认为他可能会采取不同的战略，他是否还会发动战争，我就不知道了。当然，他这样做是有原因的。事实上，从戈尔巴乔夫到叶利钦和普京，历届苏联和俄罗斯领导人都曾警告过北约不要扩张。因此，普京不是第一个警告北约的人，但他是第一个采取行动的人。事实证明，俄军作战能力还是非常具有韧性的，尽管他们一开始打得并不好。

我不认为这与台湾问题有任何直接联系，世界上有180多个国家承认台湾问题是中国的内政。正如我一开始所说的，我相信中国政府仍有耐心。华盛顿有些人认为，台海冲突不可避免，我对此不太认同。即使是美国国防部长奥斯汀都不这么认为。我出席了2023年的香格里拉对话，其中令我印象最深的是奥斯汀说台海冲突并非迫在眉睫，也绝非不可避免。此前，美国一些将军发表了自己的看法，称中国大陆在2025年或2027年前必定会对台动武。但是，美国国防部长有条件获得所有的情报信息佐证自己的观点，所以奥斯汀在这样一个重要会议上的明确表态非常重要。

有人说台湾人不愿意与大陆统一。我认为，事实可能并非如此。在新冠疫情爆发之前，大约有150多万台湾人生活在中国大陆，主要集中在上海周边地区，这相当于台湾6%的人口。这意味着，如果中国大陆能为台湾人民提供更好的就业机会和赚钱的机会，这些人就不会那么在意生活在一个制度不同的社会里。

那么大陆能否继续提供这样的环境呢？我相信是可以的。首先，中国经济已经与世界其他地区融为一体，中国必须开放，中国也希望继续开放。只要中国继续开放，而世界各地因全球化而变得距离越来越近，人们交往的速度就会越来越快，中国大陆与台湾之间的融合也会变得更快，我相信这种融合是不可避免的。最后，中国大陆从来没有宣布过统一台湾的时间表。中国大陆仍有耐心。我相信，在台湾问题上，时间能给我们带来最好的答案。

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：随着我们的对话临近尾声，让我最后问几个宏观问题。我们经常讨论中国的崛起，中国作为21世纪文明大国的地位。中国的高级官员是否担心，中国的对手美国正试图在军事、科技和经济等领域阻止中国的崛起，阻挠你们成为世界上最强大的国家？这是大家都在考虑的问题，还是西方误解了你们的真实想法以及担忧的问题？

周波：这确实是最宏大问题，其中还可以分出几十个小问题，每个问题都可能极为重要。让我重复一下我之前对别人说过的话。比如说，我们是否已经进入了一场新的冷战？我的回答很简单：在我们避免了一场热战之前，我们无从知晓，冷战期间也正是如此，大家当时每天都在为热战做准备。只有当冷战结束了，大家才松了一口气，哦，好吧，没有爆发热战，所以刚刚发生的是冷战。我认为，我们永远无法预知未来，只有经历了未来，我们才会知道“已来的和未来的”。

因此，这种问题毫无意义，但中美之间的竞争与冷战时两个超级大国的竞争显然有许多不同之处。中国对美国的政策一直保持高度一致，基调变化不大，而美国的政策就像过山车，更难预测。我认为这与他们自己的心态有很大关系。美国错误地认为自己是“山巅之城”。我问大家，“山巅之城”在哪里？雅典的帕特农神庙是唯一的“山巅之城”，却是空荡的，残破的。

帕特农神庙

最近，拜登反复强调，美国是不可或缺的。确实如此，但每个国家都是不可或缺的。在我看来，大家知道在印度洋深处有一个叫马尔代夫的小国就非常重要，这个国家太美了。我们必须记住，整个人类社会就像森林一样，有不同的动植物才造就了美丽的世界。美国有NBA、麦当劳、好莱坞，但那又怎样？马尔代夫人没有这些，他们只知道每天早上都会有成千上万的游客来到这里，告诉他们马尔代夫有多美。

回到你开头的问题，迄今为止，中国的崛起一直是非常和平的，这在人类历史上是前所未有的。在中国40多年的崛起过程中，我们唯一的牺牲是在中印边界冲突中，中方牺牲了4名士兵，同时印度方面死了20名士兵。但是值得注意的是，他们并没有互相射击，而是在互相斗殴，两支现代军队以石器时代的方式相互斗殴。为什么会这样呢？大家都不希望有战争，双方都清楚认识到，在任何情况下，我们都不应该互相射击。

回到你的问题，中国的崛起是和平的，也许在不到10年的时间内，中国就会成为世界上最大的经济体。这将是人类历史上前所未有的，一个国家不费一枪一弹就攀登上世界之巅，这真的令人难以置信。在人类历史上，许多人为各种战争编造出了五花八门的理由。但最终，谁会在乎这些导致人们死亡的理由？看看美国杀死了多少人？他们找出各种借口，但人死不能复生。

中国不同。中国军队在海外的最大特点是只致力于人道主义行动，无论是维和、打击海盗还是救灾。作为一名退役军人，作为一名老兵，我希望中国能继续和平崛起，希望中国人民解放军只在海外开展人道主义行动，只向世界各地的人民提供援助，而不杀戮。一个全球最强大的国家的军队在海外行事如此温和，这难道不是世界之幸吗？我不知道世界是否会变得更加美好，但我希望随着中国的崛起，中国能让世界变得更加安全。

中国联合国维和部队（图源：新华社）

鲁德亚德·格里福茨：周波，借你吉言来结束这次精彩的对话真是再好不过了。我非常感谢你今天抽出时间参与我们的对话，我们接收到了你传递的信息。让我们继续对话，我认为对话才是我们所能做的最重要的事情，让人们接触不同的思想，通过这些思想触发交流，希望通过交流达成互相理解。感谢你今天的发言。

周波：谢谢你。

以下为英文原文：

Rudyard Griffith: Zhou Bo, welcome to the Munk dialogues.

Zhou Bo: Hi, Rudyard. Nice to be here.

Rudyard Griffith: Would you characterize the increasingly uncertain status of Taiwan as China's biggest national security issue at this time?

Zhou Bo: Well, Taiwan is always the biggest national security concern for China. The reason is very simple, actually. For all the militaries around the world, territorial and national defense is top priority. What makes China different is that it has some other missions, being a major power. China has a very unique role. First, as a major power, it is not reunified. This is extremely rare among major powers. And besides, it has to go abroad, it has interests overseas. So we are talking about a major power that is so sophisticated and complicated.

This is a kind of natural feeling for Chinese, to have a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Then there are a number of questions. First, are we becoming impatient? This is actually a big question. I would say we're still patient. For example, in October 2022， in President Xi Jinping's report to the Chinese Communist Parties Congress, he still talked about Taiwan issue using two phrases that impress me most. That is, we still have the utmost sincerity, and we would make utmost efforts in the peaceful reunification.

Then, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan invited a massive Chinese PLA drill around the island with live firing of missiles and so on so forth. But during Tsai Ingwen’s meeting with Kevin McCarthy in California, we again did exercise, but that exercise was only simulated attack without firing a bullet. So there is great subtlety. That means we know how to handle the situation, or at least our measures are cautious and measured.

Rudyard Griffith: What is the feeling in China amongst the national security establishment regarding the increasing arming of Taiwan by the United States with sophisticated weapon systems, most notably promises of surface to sea missiles that could allow Taiwan, should it wish, in some unfortunate set of circumstances, attack and potentially sink Chinese vessels off its shores？ Are these types of actions by the United States perceived as provocative in China or they are just seen more as a nuisance, a pattern of behavior that you've seen in the past and that you're not giving any more priority to now than you did previously?

Zhou Bo: I think they're certainly considered provocative, but the question is, do they really matter or not? I don't think they would matter tremendously. For example, Taiwan recently made the first indigenous submarine, and they're going to make about eight. But how important are these submarines? From my experience as a serviceman, I know the submarine is much more sophisticated than an aircraft. I came from Air Force. I'm not a pilot, but I know normally aircraft can never be said to be mature until a pilot has flown it for many years. That means it was produced, it was trialed, but then only the pilot can tell you how many problems it really has. So with the first conventional submarine, I'm sure there's a lot of problems. And actually it was delivered in a hurry because this would be a kind of a political legacy of Tsai Ingwen. Even if they could produce 8 submarines, would that matter? Yes, it could complicate decision making in the PLA. But generally speaking, in comparison with China's military advances by leap and bonds, it doesn't really matter.

I think the United States is now adopting a strategy of turning Taiwan into a “porcupine”. But do they really believe Taiwan could be such a powerful porcupine? I doubt about it, but it serves their interest to show that what they’re supporting a so-called democracy, it serves the interest of the American military industrial complex of selling weapons, why not if it is such a good opportunity? I think it also serve them as kind of bargaining chips in this ever sophisticated relationship between China and the United States.

I think Americans actually have made some progress through learning from the failures. For example, “decoupling” now looks totally like nonsense. So they called it “de-risking”, which is actually the term borrowed from Von der Leyen. But why do they call it de-risking? Because it sounds okay, more moderate, because decoupling is impossible. But what does de-risking mean? I think they would have to search their own souls to find out, because even de-risking in semiconductors and chips, they would find it increasingly difficult. It's not that we are asking them to do what they don't want to do, it’s the chips manufacturers. They would put pressure on the White House because they're losing Chinese market.

I think the United States is actually having a problem with its One China policy, because internally, we know, people like Richard Haas, the former president of American Council of Foreign Relations, has written an article about how American policy toward China should turn from ambiguity to clarity. But some other scholars disagree with him, because this kind of clarity actually would make the situation more dangerous. Why is this kind of debate happening? I believe that is because the strength of the PRC is growing, because in the past, PRC was weak, that even if they maintained a policy of ambiguity, you don't know what kind of attitude they're having. And you're in doubt, you're constantly guessing. But because mainland’s strength is growing, they're afraid that unless they make it clear that they would defend Taiwan militarily, probably mainland China would launch attack on Taiwan first. But if they make this kind of policy with clarity, some people are afraid this may just invite a preemptive strike from the mainland in the first place. So I think they're now caught in this dilemma.

And look at the American domestic situation. The Biden administration is weak and this kind of bipartisan rivalry is extreme. Economically speaking, it is doing good, but if you listen to Donald Trump, American's whole situation is “carnage”. Liberal democracy has been in steady decline for 17 years. And who did that? Apparently, it has nothing to do with China or Russia. And for Chinese like me, or anybody, it's so appalling to see an American president would ask protesters to take over Capitol Hill. This is unbelievable. This is an eye opener. And this won't even happen in an African country. So putting all this together, how confident are we in a stable American policy toward China on Taiwan? I really have serious doubt.

Rudyard Griffith: You mentioned the debate in American political circles; some Republicans are arguing there should be an explicit US security guarantee extended to Taiwan, similar to an Article 5 type commitment within NATO. What would be Beijing's reaction if that policy came into force? Would that be seen as provocative?

Zhou Bo: Let's first look into the debate about One China policy, or about ambiguity versus clarity. Eventually, they still talk about One China. Why? Because they're actually hollowing out this concept, but they still put it as a big basket, because this would make things easier for them, they can just use endless different explanations to explain what is One China. If you do not say it is One China, then of course that is kind of earthquake for them and for us.

I think we can learn from Nancy Pelosi's visit that we're serious about it. Some people asked me, what would happen if a new American House speaker visit Taiwan. I said I don't know because, certainly we have a Plan A, Plan B, Plan C, but I can guess out of my gut feeling that our response has to be greater. Otherwise, how can we just tell ourselves that we're doing the right thing?

I doubt they would actually openly support Taiwan’s independence in such a manner, but I'm fully confident that Chinese Mainland being stronger now has more means to handle this.

Rudyard Griffith: This debate over American posture towards Taiwan is unfolding within a larger American strategy in the South Pacific, AUKUS. Around that, there is an effort to develop closer security ties with Japan, the Philippines, to a certain extent, South Korea. How is this being perceived by Chinese security officials? Is there a feeling of encroachment here, a feeling of an adversary setting up a concerted opposition against China's rise, China's expansion?

Zhou Bo: Let me start by talking a bit about the American's grand strategy. I believe the fact that the United States is focusing on Asia-Pacific, or what American call Indo-Pacific, is actually a reflection of the fact that American strength has really declined. So that is why you would find American officials talking about importance of allies and partners, because their own strength is not enough; they have to rely on these allies and partners.

You have mentioned all these people and different situations. I believe this, generally speaking, is an American effort to contain China in this region. The problem is, after I read the Indo-Pacific strategy, I found that they have many purposes, but without adequate tools.

No nations are stupid in black-and-white manner. I believe the world has entered into an era that all countries are picking sides with issues rather than with sides. But when it comes to Japan, which has treaty obligation to support the United States should there be a conflict in Taiwan Strait in terms of logistic supply, Japan would have to do that. But for Australia, they talked about it, but it's hard to say. You won't know what a man really wants to do unless it comes to the final moment. If you examine the history of Australia, you would find this country very interesting in that, historically, it always fought other people's wars elsewhere, in Gallipoli, Afghanistan or somewhere far away from continental Australia, except during the Second World War when Japanese bombed Darwin. So this is an interesting country, always fighting other people's war. But now 1/3 of their export goes to China. And yes, they are buying eight submarines. But how important are these eight submarines? It's almost like the submarines in Taiwan, they could complicate decision making in Beijing, but it's not a big deal, because in terms of number of ships, we're already the largest in the world, and these eight submarines will be delivered probably after 10 to 15 years, to say the least. By then, how much stronger the PLA will become? I think this has a lot to do with the Morrison government. Right now, the Albanese government is also making changes. So this whole picture is not so black and white.

The Philippines is interesting, in that President Marcos’ policy toward China seems to be a U-turn from his predecessor. I personally ask myself, why is this? Because President Duterte certainly has curried a lot of favor with China, even if he himself would support the ruling of the tribunal that was in favor of the Philippines. So on this policy issue, he actually did not mention it so often, but he certainly was supportive of the tribunal ruling. But then, knowing this, he just went along to have good relations with China for some other benefits. But when it came to President Marcos, it's difficult for me to understand because I believe there are something to do with his personal background, because of his firmer or stronger connection with the United States and the Filipino military, basically, all the senior officers were more or less trained in the United States. Still, it doesn't make sense to me, because China has never threatened to use force against any of the claimants in the South China Sea.

China actually has laid down three conditions when it might adopt non-peaceful means regarding the Taiwan issue. But on the South China Sea, China has never threatened any other country. So if all of a sudden the Filipino government would open up nine bases for American use, then we would ask, why? This doesn't really make sense. Actually, it would make the Philippines more vulnerable, because if Americans use these as a kind of a forefront battlefields, then, of course, the territories of the Philippines become targets, is that in their interests?

Rudyard Griffith: What are the lessons that Chinese leaders are drawing from the war in Ukraine? There is an argument that part of what provoked Putin into his invasion was a perception on his part of NATO and western powers arming Ukraine, supporting political movements and political actors that were not in Russia's interests, and that ultimately Ukraine was becoming a security risk for Russia because of its proximity to Moscow and other decision making centers in the country. So does China feel similarly that there's a risk here, a pattern that had unfolded in Ukraine could potentially unfold in Taiwan or the South China Sea, is history gonna

Zhou Bo: Well, on the war in Ukraine, I would say if Putin knows what would happen, he probably would adopt a different strategy. Whether that strategy is war or not, I just don't know. But of course, there is a reason why he would have to do this. The truth is actually from all the Soviet and Russian leaders, starting from like Gorbachev to Yeltsin and Putin all warned against nato’s expansion. So he's not the first person to make a warning, but he's the first person to say enough is enough. The Russian military has proven to be extremely resilient, but was not fighting so well in the beginning.

I would not say that this has any direct link with the Taiwan issue, because that actually is recognized by more than 180 countries to be China's internal affair. As I said in the beginning, I believe the Chinese government is still patient. Some people in Washington believe this kind of conflict is inevitable. I actually have some doubts, even by quoting what Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said himself. I was in last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue. What impressed me most is that he talked about conflict being not imminent, not inevitable. The background is, before his remarks, there were quite a few remarks made by some American generals talking about 2025 scenario or 2027 scenario that Mainland China would definitely launch attacks or so on and so forth. But because America’s secretary of defense should have all the intelligence information to support his argument, so it is important for him to make it clear on such an important meeting.

Some people say Taiwanese people do not want to be integrated with you. And I believe this may not be so true. Before Covid, actually more than 1.5 million Taiwanese people were living in Mainland China, mostly around Shanghai. And that would be more than 6% of the Taiwanese population. What does that mean? If the Chinese Mainland can provide Taiwanese with better opportunities of employment, or making money, these people actually don't care so much to live in a different society with different systems, right? So could Chinese Mainland continue to provide this kind of environment? I believe it is possible. Because first of all, Chinese economy is so integrated with the rest of the world, China has to open up. And China wants to continue to open up. And so long as China continues to opens up while the world is becoming smaller because of globalization, the speed of people's interaction will simply become faster. This kind of integration between Mainland China and Taiwan will also become faster. So it is in this logic, I believe this kind of integration is inevitable. And finally, the Chinese Mainland has never announced a timetable to reunify. So we're still patient. I believe time might just give us the best help in this regard.

Rudyard Griffith: We're coming to the end of our time, so let me just ask some final bigger picture questions. We've talked a lot about China's rise, its status as a civilizational power in the 21st century. To what extent are your colleagues, senior security officials in China, concerned that you now face an adversary in the United States who is trying across a series of domains, military, technological and economic, to prevent China's rise, to thwart your ascension to potentially becoming the world's dominant power. Is that on people's minds or is this more of a western misinterpretation of what your people are actually thinking and what you're actually concerned about?

Zhou Bo: This is really the biggest questions, and out of this question, there could be dozens of smaller questions and each one of them could be extremely important. Let me repeat what I said to some people, that is whether we have entered into a new cold war, for example. My answer is very simple: we won't know until we have avoided a hot war, because this is exactly what happened during the Cold War. Every day people actually were preparing for a hot war, right? But people went through it and had a big relief, okay, we didn't have a hot war, so what happened was a cold war. My argument is, we never know the future and we would only know the future when we have gone through it.

So this kind of question is meaningless, but apparently there are so many different things from this kind of competition between China and the US and the one during the cold war between the two superpowers. I think what happened is that, if you look at China's policy toward the United States, it has been fairly consistent. It didn't change tone much, and the United States would behave like a roller coaster, that's much more difficult to predict. I think that has a lot of things to do with their own mentality, because that country wrongly believe that they're the City upon the Hill. I tell people, where is the city upon the hill? The Parthenon is the only city upon the hill, it is empty, broken.

Recently, Biden repeated how the United States is indispensable. That is right. But every nation is indispensable. In my view, it is indispensable for people to know that there is a small country called The Maldives deep in the Indian Ocean. It is so beautiful. It is so important for human beings to remember that this whole human society is just like a forest that has different fauna and flora, and that is why the world is beautiful. It is fine that the United States has NBA, McDonald, Hollywood, but so what? The Maldivians don't have any of these, but they just know every morning thousands of tourists would come and just tell them how beautiful their country is.

Finally, back to your question in the beginning. So far, China's rise is very peaceful and this is unprecedented in human history. In China's rise of 40 year and plus, the only sacrifice we made is four soldiers on our side and 20 Indian soldiers on the other side, because of a clash along the border. But it is interesting because they were not shooting at each other, they were fighting physically with each other. The two modern militaries were fighting each other in a manner found in the Stone Age. Why is that? War is not popular, and people from both side know that in any circumstances, we should not shoot at each other.

So back to your question, China's rise is peaceful and probably in less than 10 years’ time, China may become the largest economy in the world. This then would be unprecedented in human history to see a country reaching the Apogee of fame, of glory, without firing a bullet. This still stands. We didn't find a bullet. How unbelievable that is. In human history, people gave all kind of reasons or justifications for all kinds of war. But eventually, who remember all these reasons that have caused people to die? Nobody gives a damn about the reason. Look at the United States, how many people have died because of them? They may give reasons, but people died.

China has made a difference. The Chinese military is remarkable overseas in that it only commits itself to humanitarian operations, be it peacekeeping, counterpiracy or disaster relief. As an ex-serviceman, as a veteran, my hope for my country is China continues to rise peacefully and China's PLA will only conduct humanitarian operations overseas. In that way, you just provide assistance to people around the world. You're not killing anyone. For a country that rises to the top of the world, and for its military to behave so mildly overseas, isn't the world lucky to have such a power? So my hope is, I don't know whether the world would become more beautiful, but I hope with China's rise, China can actually make the world safer.

Rudyard Griffith: Zhou Bo, those are great words for us to end this fascinating conversation on. I really appreciate your time coming to us from China to have this conversation with us today. It's an important one and your messages are heard and received. And let's keep these dialogues going because I think that's really what is important for us to do is to have conversations, to expose each other to different ideas, and through those ideas come conversations, and through conversations hopefully come understanding. So thank you for your contributions today.

Zhou Bo: Thank you, Rudyard, for this conversation.

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