【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波】

印度洋就是印度的洋吗？无论这一问题看似多么荒谬，但如果你的交谈对象是一个笃信“大婆罗多(Akhand Bharat)”构想（即“不可分割的印度”）的印度教民族主义者，答案可能是肯定的。

在这套话语体系下，不仅印度洋成了“印度教徒的伟大海洋”(Hindu Mahasagar)，古婆罗多的地理版图还包括现如今的阿富汗、缅甸、巴基斯坦、孟加拉国、中国西藏、尼泊尔、不丹、斯里兰卡和马尔代夫。

当印度总理莫迪还是古吉拉特邦的首席部长时，他曾在2012年的一次采访中说，应该在文化统一的背景下看待“大婆罗多”。

然而，这种“大印度”的观念迄今依然存在，这可能就是德里对周边弱小邻国习惯性以“老大哥”自居的原因之一。为尝试改变这种状况，莫迪总理在2014年第一个任期开始时，曾提出“邻国优先”政策，却未能吸引住印度次大陆的邻居们。德里自身的行为难辞其咎。

以斯里兰卡为例。2014年，斯里兰卡允许一艘中国潜艇在科伦坡停靠，引发了印度的强烈反对。然后，2017年，斯里兰卡拒绝了一艘中国潜艇停靠科伦坡补给的请求，人们普遍认为这是新德里向斯里兰卡施压的结果。

当斯里兰卡在今年7月12日宣布允许中国科考船“远望5号”将停靠汉班托塔港进行补给时，印度又对此提出抗议，声称这关系到“印度的安全和经济利益”。 这导致科伦坡要求中国科考船“远望5号”推迟其到港计划。

针对印度媒体关于“远望5号”是“间谍船”的报道，中国外交部发言人汪文斌表示，“远望5号科考船进行海洋科考活动符合国际法和国际通行惯例，不影响任何国家的安全和经济利益。”

“远望5号科考船抵达斯里兰卡的汉班托塔港（图源：法新社）

虽然科伦坡最终搁置新德里的抗议，允许该船在8月16日至22日泊靠，但令人警惕的是，印度已经一次又一次地反对另一个国家行使主权，为中国船只进行补给。

这就引出了一个问题：中国和印度能否在印度洋共存？

誓要成为印度洋“净安全提供者”的印度，显然不满于中国在该地区日益增长的影响力。2020年中国和印度士兵在加勒万河谷发生的致命斗殴事件，助长了印度的怨恨。一些印度战略家甚至认为，中国企图从海上包抄印度。但这样的分析显然是对印度重要性的间接的自吹自擂，且显示其对北京的优先事项解读并不到位。中国有更紧迫的事务。在美国将中国视为其最大的战略竞争对手的情况下，中国不得不与充满敌意的美国抗衡，哪有时间围堵印度。

中国在印度洋的利益

但这并不是说中国对印度洋没有兴趣。恰恰相反。要知道90%的全球贸易都是通过海路运输的。作为世界上最大的贸易国，中国自然会关注国际海上通道的安全。此外，中国在包括印度在内的南亚国家有大量投资。2021年，中印双边贸易创下了1256亿美元的历史新高。这就解释了为什么自2008年底以来，中国海军一直不停地派出海军编队在印度洋进行巡逻。2017年，中国在吉布提建立了第一个海外军事基地，以保障反海盗行动。

为了维护中国在印度洋不断增长的利益，拥有世界上最大海军的中国人民解放军必须保持甚至加强其在印度洋的存在。因此，中国和印度的海军舰艇势必会更频繁地在海上相遇。

中国航母打击群出现在印度洋只是时间问题。届时印度将如何应对？

或者，设想最坏的情况，中国和印度会有一天在印度洋上发生冲突吗？这种可能性虽然很低，但并不是零。2017年，中国和印度在中国和不丹之间的争议地区洞朗对峙长达73天，冲突一触即发。

印度军事策略家们一贯认为，尽管本国在中印边境可能处于劣势，但鉴于印度的地利之便，它在印度洋上肯定比中国有优势。

但这并不能保证印度海军在潜在的冲突中能获胜。印度不具备与中国进行零和游戏的物质条件。要知道中国的经济总量近乎印度的五倍，国防开支是印度的四倍。

印度在美国印太战略中的角色

那么印度在美国遏制中国的印太战略中会扮演什么角色？印度是“四方安全对话” 的成员国，这是一个由美国领导的俱乐部，还包括日本和澳大利亚，成员气味相投。由于其他三国已互为盟友，因此四方安全对话是否会在未来演变成一个反华俱乐部，很大程度上取决于印度的态度。到目前为止，印度还算是谨慎的。四方安全对话唯一的军事部分是在孟加拉湾的马拉巴尔举行的海军演习。不过，最近印度和美国宣布计划在10月举行一次联合演习，演习地点距离中国和印度的实际控制线只不到100公里。

随着中美竞争加剧，印度对美国的重要性必定会增加。但是，避免中美在印太地区的对抗，才最符合印度的国家利益。如果中美之间的竞争加剧，印度在印度洋的回旋余地就会随之缩小。

如果印度真的奉行“邻国优先”，或许它应该首先考虑好如何与更强大的邻国—中国和睦相处。印度若执意在与中国关系的问题上向周边国家施压，只会使这些邻国与北京走得越来越近。

翻译：中国论坛 蒋绍澄

核译：中国论坛 许馨匀 韩桦

本文英文原文：

Is the Indian Ocean India’s ocean? However absurd this question might seem, the answer is probably yes if you talk to a Hindu nationalist who believes in Akhand Bharat (“undivided India”).

According to this concept, not only is the Indian Ocean Hind Mahasagar (an ocean of the Hindus), the geographic expanse of the ancient Bharat extended as far as modern-day Afghanistan, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi was chief minister of Gujarat, he said in a 2012 interview that Akhand Bharat should be seen in the context of cultural unity. 

Yet this notion of a Greater India persists and is probably one reason for Delhi’s habitual “big brother” attitude towards its smaller neighbours. Prime Minister Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” policy, introduced at the beginning of his first tenure in 2014, sought to change that. But the policy has not gained traction among India’s subcontinental neighbours and Delhi’s own actions are to blame.

Consider the example of Sri Lanka. In 2014, Sri Lanka allowed a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo, triggering fierce opposition from India. Then, in 2017, New Delhi was widely believed to have pressured Sri Lanka into rejecting a request from China to let a Chinese submarine dock in Colombo for resupply.

When Sri Lankan announced on July 12 this year that it would permit a Chinese research/survey vessel Yuan Wang 5 to dock at Hambantota Port for replenishment, India protested, saying it has a bearing on “India’s security and economic interests”. This caused Colombo to ask Beijing to defer the arrival of the Chinese ship. 

In response to Indian media reports about the Yuan Wang 5 being a ‘spy ship’, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said the vessel was conducting scientific research “in accordance with international law” and “does not affect the security and economic interests of any country”.

Although Colombo set aside New Delhi’s protests and eventually allowed the ship to berth from Aug 16-22, it is alarming that India has time and again objected to replenishment of Chinese ships by another state exercising its sovereign rights.

This prompts a question: could China and India coexist in the Indian Ocean?

Obviously, India, which vows to become a “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean, is not happy with China’s growing influence in the region. The deadly brawl between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley in 2020 only added to India’s resentment. Some Indian strategists believe that China wants to encircle India from the sea. But such an analysis is an indirect form of self-praise of India’s importance and is off the mark in its reading of Beijing’s priorities; China has more pressing business. At a time when China has to contend with actions from a hostile United States, which sees it as its top strategic competitor, it would be too busy to encircle India.

CHINA’S INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

But that is not to say the Indian Ocean is of no interest to China. It is. Ninety per cent of global trade goes through the sea route. As the largest trading nation in the world, China is naturally concerned over the security of international sea lanes. Besides, China has huge investments in South Asian countries, including India. In 2021, China-India bilateral trade hit a record high of US$125.6 billion. This explains why since the end of 2008, the PLA Navy has been sending naval flotillas non-stop to patrol in the Indian Ocean. In 2017, it established its first military base in Djibouti to facilitate counter-piracy operations.

To safeguard its ever-growing interests in the Indian Ocean, the PLA, which has the largest navy in the world, has to maintain or even strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean. Chinese and Indian naval vessels are bound to meet more often at sea.

It is only a matter of time before a Chinese aircraft carrier strike group shows up in the Indian Ocean. How will India react then?

Or, in the worst scenario, could China and India clash one day in the Indian Ocean? Such a likelihood is low, but not zero. In 2017, China and India nearly went to war in a face-off that lasted 73 days in Doklam, a disputed area between China and Bhutan.

India’s military planners traditionally believe that although the country may have a disadvantage along the China-India border, it certainly has an advantage over China at sea in the Indian Ocean, given India’s geographic proximity.

But there is no guarantee that the Indian Navy will prevail in a potential conflict. India does not have the material capabilities to engage in a zero-sum game with China. China’s economy is almost five times larger, and its defence spending four times larger than that of India.

INDIA IN AMERICA’S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

And what role would India play in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy of containing China? India is a member of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) – a US-led club of like-minded members that also includes Japan and Australia. Whether it might evolve into an anti-China club in the future depends very much on India since the three other countries are already allies. So far, India is cautious. The only military component of Quad is a naval exercise in Malabar in the Bay of Bengal. Recently though India and the US announced plans to hold a joint exercise in October, less than 100km from the line of actual control between China and India.

With China-US competition expected to intensify, India’s importance to the US will surely grow. But India’s national interests are best served by avoiding China-US rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Should the rivalry between China and US intensify, India’s room to manoeuvre in the Indian Ocean will be reduced.

If India truly believes in “Neighbourhood First”, perhaps it should consider how to live in amity with its more powerful neighbour first. Pressuring its smaller neighbours on their relations with China will only drive them closer to Beijing.