【翻译/李泽西】

DW编辑：非常感谢你在参加慕尼黑安全会议期间接受德国之声DW对话。你是中国人民解放军一名前大校，现在是参会的中国代表团一员。我们已经听了中国最高外交官王毅发表的讲话，显然这是一次非常有影响力的演说。其中，他谈到了主权和领土完整的重要性。他说，这些是国际体系的基石。我想了解清楚：是否可以将此理解为对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的批评，毕竟这是对乌克兰领土完整的破坏？

周波：中国作为一个还没有完全统一的国家，我们理解主权到底有多重要，无论对于中国还是对世界其他国家。

但我认为中国对这个问题的看法，是要进一步溯源。如果你分析一起谋杀案，调查总是从谋杀开始；但实际上，谋杀是很久以前就计划好的。我们对俄罗斯有一定程度的同情，知道俄罗斯采取这种军事行动的根本原因在于北约东扩。实际上，从前苏联时期开始，其领导人就一直在谈论这个问题，从戈尔巴乔夫到叶利钦再到普京总统。而普京总统与他的前任有何不同？他不仅发出了警告，还将其贯彻到行动中。

那么，问题就来了，他为什么会这样做？ 人们谈到了势力范围。 势力范围不是什么好词。但如果俄罗斯认为它有自己的势力范围，并愿意用军事手段来捍卫，那么对俄罗斯来说就存在一个势力范围。鉴于（俄乌）两个国家的历史和紧密联系，我知道普京会从这个角度看问题，当然这并不意味着他是对的。

DW编辑：基于从中方听到的这个论点，我想追问，中国一定程度上接受俄罗斯的动机，如你所说，但这不是忽略了乌克兰人民选择他们想要什么的权利吗？

周波：看到在乌克兰发生的巨大暴行，令人心痛。这是战争的后果。看到结果，你当然要知道究竟是谁让这一切发生的。这是正确的思考方式。你也需要了解，究竟为什么会发生这一切。而这就是事情的本源。如果我们只是简单地坐在那里，看着眼前发生的一切，而不去想它究竟是如何发生的，而如果不知道它是如何发生的，你就不知道最终该如何解决这个问题。

俄乌战争一周年之际，赫尔松居民排队领取食物（图片来源：ICphoto）

DW 编辑：但是，有意思的是，中国一直非常公开地批评它所看到的，你所描述的北约东扩，却没有批评俄罗斯的入侵。您是怎么描述这次入侵的？嗯，它是谋杀，而不是动机，它是实际犯罪，而不是犯罪的原因。中国为什么不直接说这是错的？

周波：我认为中国会以一种更加平衡或精微的方式来表达。通过强调主权的重要性，我相信中国已经表明了自己的态度。在这次会议上，王毅实际上花了更多时间来谈论主权的重要性。他把这作为一个原则来谈，也提及这是《联合国宪章》中的一条。因此，我认为中方这一立场对在场人士都是清楚的，不会被误解。

DW编辑：但我仍然好奇，因为这依然是在暗示，而不是直接明确的表达。而中国在批评美国方面则用非常明确的语言。那么，为什么中国对俄罗斯委婉，而对美国则硬扛？

周波：我们在对待美国和对待俄罗斯的态度上确实存在差异，因为这两个国家对我们的态度并不相同。美国把我们当作主要竞争对手，而俄罗斯则把我们视为战略伙伴。这两个国家对中国的态度是不同的。我们必须考虑到，中国是俄罗斯最大的邻国，反之亦然。在这方面，我们必须确保我们与俄罗斯的关系是一个良好的关系，是一个可持续的关系。

当你看中俄关系时，不要总是从他者的角度来判断。这种关系必须被置于双边关系的背景下。从双边关系来看，就会明白我们真的需要与俄罗斯发展这种关系。因为我们不只是邻居，我们双方都有彼此需要的东西。这种良好的关系应该是良好的、正常的国与国关系，它不应该被其他国家放在与中国无关的事情上进行考验。作为一个中国人，我不时感到有点过于受关注了，因为现在所有的事情似乎都与中国联系起来，甚至是发生在欧洲中心地带的这场战争，即便它与中国无关。

但人们还是会问，中国站在哪一边？而你所有的问题似乎都在间接地暗示中国应该有一个明确的立场。这实际上是要求中国站队。如果中国站队了，是否还能成为一个真正的调解人？

这也是我从会议上所了解到的：大家都在问，中国能否说服俄罗斯，利用中国的影响力，说服俄罗斯应该做什么，不应该做什么。有些人甚至开始想象，说台湾海峡可能发生类似的冲突。我提到所有这些事情都是因为这场（俄乌）战争与中国没有关系，但它仍然引起了许多人对中国角色的想象或讨论。从一个方面来说，这是好的。这表明，中国真的很强大，中国真的很重要。而中国也希望以负责任的方式发挥这一作用。

中俄战略安全磋商机制双方牵头人举行会晤（图片来源：ICphoto）

DW编辑：王毅明确说了，中国将很快提出一个和平建议。显然，中国准备在寻求政治解决方案方面变得更积极。我们能期待该提案中的什么内容？

周波：我不太清楚这一提案的细节。但作为一个中国人，我也认为这场战争不符合中国的利益。如果它能立即停止，我们会非常高兴。但我们知道它不会停止，也许今年都不会。所以这场战争会持续多久，没有人知道。我不认为局势正在降温，实际上，我们看到局势正在升级。从我在会议上听到的所有情况来看，西方国家坚决支持乌克兰。而且他们已经表示，他们将通过一切手段支持乌克兰。但另一方面，俄罗斯不可能被打败。人们在谈论打败俄罗斯，这会在什么场景下？俄罗斯仍是一个拥有最大核武库的大国。所以我看到的是一种僵局。普京不会赢得这场战争，但他也很难输掉这场战争。那么届时会发生什么？这是一个悲惨的局面。

DW 编辑：您认为普京会动用核武器吗？

周波：我不知道，但我确实担心。这就是为什么我作为中国人，首先出来 （在西方媒体）说他不应该使用核武器。

DW 编辑：德国总理舒尔茨在北京访问时与中国国家主席交流，中方随后发表了一份声明，批评核威胁。中国是否准备对莫斯科施加影响，使其至少不采取使用核武器这一极端措施？

周波：我认为中国在劝阻俄罗斯不要使用核武器方面已经发挥了举足轻重的作用。我只是一名中国军队前军官，我曾（在金融时报）发表评论主张，中俄两国之间的关系是好的，但使用核武器是反人道的，核武器在任何情况下都不应该被使用。令我非常高兴的是，中国国家主席在随后的一周内就谈到了这个问题。而德国总理舒尔茨说，即便只有这个共识，他对中国的访问就值了。在G20会议上，习主席在与拜登总统的双边会谈中，重申了中国关于不使用核武器的明确立场。而这不仅是中国的立场，这也是俄罗斯自己的承诺。五个核武器国家在发表的联合声明中说，核战争打不赢也打不得。 这是俄罗斯自己的承诺。

DW编辑：你提到台海发生冲突的潜在可能，你说中国还没完全统一。因为在北京看来，台湾应该与中国统一。近几个月来，那里显然出现了严重的紧张局势。王毅在演讲后被问到可否向在场代表们保证，中国没有很快攻打台湾的计划。他回避了直接回答，而是“回怼”台湾政府，指责后者的分裂主义。他为什么要回避这个问题？为什么他不能说，别担心，我们不会打台湾，至少在未来几年不会？

周波：我无法预测他在想什么。但我知道，而且我想让德国人民知道，中国从来没有为与台湾的统一制定过时间表。这是首先要说的。第二是看国防预算，就像地理环境一样，是不会说谎的。这意味着什么？通常情况下，如果一个国家担心其安全环境，就会增加国防预算。而中国今年的国防预算，是在俄乌冲突爆发之后宣布的，仍然不到2%，就像过去几十年一样。

请记住，这是在战争爆发后宣布的。欧洲的这场战争并没有改变中国的心态。中国仍然保持平静，尽管面临诸多压力，尽管我们在二十大报告中谈到（国际环境）“风高浪急甚至惊涛骇浪”。中国对自己安全环境的信心，对其他国家也很重要。中国可以设想，美国把我们视作极限竞争对手，所以我们也必须与美国竞争。但幸运的是，中国仍然在谈论合作。而美国则将这种关系描述为一种竞争关系。

DW 编辑：但我的意思是，即使军费开支在国内生产总值中的百分比没有增加，总量也在增加。中国军力正在快速扩张。去年8月，美国众议院议长佩洛西去台湾后，中国就在台湾周围开展重大演习。她的继任者新任众议院议长麦卡锡据说也想去台湾，甚至可能正在计划一次访问。如果他去，中国会怎么做？

周波：即使在理论上，中国的反应也必须更大。佩洛西的访问没有得到拜登总统和五角大楼的同意，但她仍然坚持要去。而我们史无前例的大规模军事演习就是一种回应。如果美国坚持“一个中国“立场，为什么要挑衅中国到这种程度？有什么事情表明中国大陆马上就会打台湾吗？根本就没有这样的迹象。因此，我的回答是，美国现在实际上是高度分裂的。这种分裂不仅是在普通人和精英之间。它也是在不同权力部门之间，如立法部门与行政部门。

这种分裂甚至在军队内部也有。例如，美国四星上将谈到中国大陆将在2025年攻打台湾，说只是出于他的直觉。没有任何证据，没有任何统计数据，他就可以给他的下属写一份备忘录，告诉他们中国大陆即将打台湾。而这甚至没有得到五角大楼的同意。他怎么能发表这种不负责任的言论？五角大楼为什么没有对他进行监管？因此，这引发了许多问题，而不是中国大陆是否真的会在2025年攻打台湾的问题。

DW编辑：目前，关于美中关系的稳定性也存在重大问题，这部分是“间谍气球”的戏剧性事件引起的。气球本身不一定构成任何威胁，但它引起了对中美之间危机管理能力的担忧，如果意外危机出现的话。双方之间确实没有合适的热线电话来处理这个问题。您对这个问题有多担心？

周波：这是关于我们如何给中美关系加“护栏“的问题。我们必须使其稳定。而具有讽刺意味的是，双方都有同样的良好愿望，但不知道如何去做。谈论设置“护栏”是困难的，因为较弱的一方可能会认为较强的一方想要锁定现状，以保持优势。因此，只有在双方实力大致相当的情况下，才能建立“护栏”。

美方指责中方的民用气象气球为“间谍气球”并用战斗机进行击落（图片来源：网络）

这一点在冷战时期就可以发现。从冷战一开始，两个超级大国的实力就大致相当，因此，他们可以建立诸多建立信任的机制，特别是在核领域。而中国和美国的军事力量对比不是这样的情况，我们比美国弱得多。当然，在某种程度上这并不重要。

DW编辑：但这不会持续太久。预计中国军队在2030年到2039年间，在很多重要领域接近或与美军平起平坐。 那么，这是否意味着，在2030年之前，我们将不得不在中美没有热线和护栏的情况下过日子？

周波：我不认为到2030年，中国军队会追上美国军队的实力。以前我们只谈中国在本世纪中期建成世界一流军队。我们还有很长的路要走。问题是，世界一流军队意味着什么？当然美国拥有世界一流的军队。但对于中国来说，要赶上美国，必须等到本世纪中期。但在二十大报告中，我们谈到了加快这一进程，我仍然相信它不会早于2030年。

但请记住一件事。这种实力上的差距，在西太平洋地区并不那么重要了。因为，从全球来看，中国军队不会与美军争夺主导地位，只要我们有能力捍卫我们在西太平洋地区的主权和领土完整，这对我们来说就足够了。

DW 编辑：您认为到时候是不是中美在西太平洋地区摊牌的时候？这一刻是否变得越来越不可避免了？

周波：不，我不这么认为。相反，我相信那时候将是双边关系开始变得稳定的时候。而在它变得稳定之前，才是最危险的时候。从现在到那时，是最危险的。

DW编辑：最后让我回到那个向王毅提出的有关打台湾的风险的问题。各国人民真的很关心这个问题。大家看到了乌克兰战争所产生的影响。对台湾的战争可能在世界范围内造成更大的不稳定。您曾是中国军官，您能说些什么来让大家放心，也许这（攻打）根本不会发生？

周波：这种比较，或者说人们看到欧洲的战争，并不表明台海一定会发生一场类似的战争。我们希望和平统一，因为这当然符合我们自己的利益。一个完全被打烂了的台湾有什么用？所以人们不应该怀疑我们对和平统一的诚意。我们不会放弃非和平的手段，但那只是保留给一些极端情况。

DW 编辑：非常感谢您接受我们的对话，周大校。

对话英文原文实录：

DW Richard Walker: Zhou Bo, thank you very much for joining DW here at the Munich security conference. Now, you're a former senior colonel in China's military and the PLA. You're a member of the Chinese delegation here, and we've heard from Wang yi, China's top diplomat, making a speech here. A very impactful speech, certainly. Let's pick up on one thing. He spoke about the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. He said, these are cornerstones of the international system. Now, I just want to be clear: should we understand that as a criticism, then, of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which was, of course, a breach of Ukraine's territorial integrity?

Zhou Bo: Well, China, as a country that is not fully re-united, certainly is more concerned with this issue of sovereignty. So we understand how sovereignty matters really, be it in China or in the rest of the world. Talking about this war, I'm sure Mr. Wang Yi is referring to the war in Ukraine. And clearly, I believe this is the violation of sovereignty of one country by another country. This is clear.

But I think China's thoughts on this issue, it just goes a bit further to the root causes. Because if you talk about a murder, an investigation always started from murder. But actually the murder was planned long time ago. Because we have some sympathies with Russia in knowing that the fundamental reason for Russia to take this kind of military action is because of NATO’s expansion. And actually, Russian leaders have been talking about this ever since the Soviet time, from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin to President Putin. And what makes President Putin different from his predecessors? He'd not only give a warning, but he also carried it into action.

So then we have this question. Why would he do this? So people talk about the sphere of influence. Sphere of influence is a dirty word. But if Russia believes it has a sphere of influence that would like to defend it with military means, then there is a sphere of influence for Russia. And given the history of the two countries and think of  the great connectivity between these two countries, so I kind of know what Putin would look at this issue from this perspective, which of course doesn't mean he's right.

DW Richard Walker: But just to drill down into this argument, which we've heard from the Chinese side. So sort of accepting Russia's motivations, as you suggest, but doesn't this ignore the right of the people of Ukraine to choose what they want?

Zhou Bo: I think that it is really miserable to see the great atrocities that occurred in Ukraine. And this is the aftermath of the war. So to see the results, you of course need to know who actually has made this possible. That is the right way of thinking. But you also need to know why this has happened at all. And that is the root cause of this thing. We just sit simply look at these things in front of eyes without thinking about how it actually has happened. And without knowing how it has happened, you don't know how to resolve this eventually.

DW Richard Walker: But it is interesting to see, China has been very openly critical of what it sees, what you describe as NATO expansion into eastern Europe, but it has not been critical of Russia for the invasion. And you describe the invasion? Well, it is the murder, not the motive. It is the actual crime, not the reason for it. Why doesn't China simply say this is wrong?

Zhou Bo: I think China would put it in a more balanced or subtle way. Because by stressing the importance of sovereignty, I believe that China has already made its attitude clear. And I believe at this conference, Mr. Wang Yi has actually spent more time talking about the importance of sovereignty. And he talked about this as a principle. And he talked about this as found in the UN Charter. So I think this message should already be clear to all the people here. It cannot be misunderstood.

DW Richard Walker: But I'm still curious because it's still leaving it on the level of implication rather than outright, explicit language. Whereas China is very clearly using explicit language with respect to its criticism of the United States. So why is it holding back on Russia but not holding back on America?

Zhou Bo: Well, I think there is a difference indeed, in an attitude toward the United States and toward Russia, because we were taken differently by these two countries as well. We were taken as the primary competitor by United States, and we were taken as the strategic partner by Russia. Therefore, the attitude of these two countries are different toward China. And we have to consider China is also Russia's largest neighbor and vice versa. In this regard, we have to make sure that our relationship with Russia is a good one, is a sustainable one.

When you look at the China-Russian relationship, do not always judge it from the eyes of a third person. This relationship has to be put into context of bilateral relationship. But if you look at this from the bilateral relationship, then you would understand we really need to develop this relationship with Russia. Because we're not just a neighbor, because both of us have all what we need from each other. This kind of a good relationship should be good and normal state to state relationship. It should not be put on the test by other countries on something that China has nothing to do with. Being a Chinese, I sometimes feel flattered in that nowadays everything seems to be related to China. Even about this war in the heart of Europe, which has nothing to do with China.

But people would still say, which side do you want to take? And all your questions seem to be suggesting indirectly that China should have a clear cut position. And this actually is a kind of asking China to take a side. And then we have this question whether China would be that serious mediator.

This is what I learned at this conference: could China just persuade Russia, make use of your influence towards what Russia should or should not do. And then it even give people some imagination as to how a similar conflict might occur in Taiwan Strait. So all these things what I mentioned is because this war has nothing to do with China. But still it invites so many people's imagination or discussion about the role of China. In the one aspect, this is good. This shows that China is really powerful, China is really important. And China also wants to play this role in a responsible manner.

DW Richard Walker: So Wang Yi did say that China will soon present a peace proposal. So it is becoming evident China is prepared to become quite active in the search for a political solution. What can we expect in that proposal?

Zhou Bo: Well, I'm not so sure what are the details of his proposal. But as a Chinese, I believe I share the same feeling that this war is not in China's interest. If it can stop immediately, we would be most happy. But we know it won't stop. Probably not at all this year. And so how long this war will last, nobody knows, but I don't believe right now we are seeing de-escalation of the situation. We're actually seeing escalation of the situation. Because from all what I heard at the Munich Security conference, the west is adamantly supportive of Ukraine. And they have expressed that they would support Ukraine by all means. But on the other hand, Russia could not be defeated. So people talk about defeating Russia, but in what context? Russia will still remain a large country with the largest nuclear arsenal. So I see a stalemate. Putin will not win the war. But he can hardly lose the war. So what would happen then? It is a miserable situation.

DW Richard Walker: Do you think Putin might use nuclear weapons?

Zhou Bo: I don't know, but I worry about this. So that is why I'm the first Chinese who talked he should not use nuclear weapon.

DW Richard Walker: When Olaf Schulz, the German chancellor was in Beijing, he spoke to Xi Jinping. And there was a statement that came out also from Xi Jinping criticizing nuclear threats even. Is China prepared to use influence on Moscow to at least not go to that grim step of using nuclear weapons?

Zhou Bo: I think China has already played a pivotal role in dissuading any possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia. I'm only a former PLA officer, I wrote this opinion: I know the relationship between our two countries are good, but this is about humanity. Nuclear weapons should not be used in any cases. So I wrote it. But I was most happy that my president talked about it in a week's time. And the German chancellor Schulz said that even with just this agreement, his visit to China was worthwhile. And my president in his bilateral talks with president Biden at the G20, reiterated China’s clear cut position about no use of nuclear weapon. And this is not only China's position, this is Russia's own promise. Because in a joint statement by five nuclear weapon states, they have made a joint statement that a nuclear war cannot be won. So therefore should not be fought. This is Russia's own promise.

DW Richard Walker: you mentioned that the prospect of a potential conflict in the Taiwan Straits, and also referred to China as a not united country. Because in the view of Beijing, Taiwan should be reunified with China. There have obviously been serious tensions there in recent months. Wang Yi, again from his speech, he was asked at the very end whether he could reassure the people, the delegates here in Munich, that China is not planning an imminent attack on Taiwan. He dodged the question. He essentially turned it around and put the blame on the Taiwanese government, accusing it of being separatist. Why did he dodge that question? Why can't he say, don't worry, we're not going to attack, at least in the next few years?

Zhou Bo: I cannot predict what is on his mind. But I know, and I would like your people to know that China has never laid down a timetable for reunification with Taiwan. This is the first thing. The second thing is, defense budget, like geography, would not lie. What do I mean by that? Normally, if you are worried about your security environment, you would increase defense budget. And China's defense budget this year, that was announced after this war, was still less than 2%, like in decades. Remember, this is announced after the war. This war in Europe didn't change China's mentality. China still remains calm, although it has a lot of pressures, although in our 20th congress report, we talked about the high wind, the heavy storm. So China's confidence about its own security environment matters even to the rest of the world. If China believes, OK, the United States takes us as an extreme competitor, so we have to compete with the United States. It's good that China, is still talking about cooperation, while United States describes this relationship as one of a competition.

DW Richard Walker: And yet, I mean, even if it's not increasing as a percentage of GDP, military spending is increasing. Certainly the Chinese military is expanding at a significant level. And we saw major exercises around Taiwan after the US house of representative speaker Nancy Pelosi visited there last August. Her successor , speaker of the house, Kevin McCarthy is said to want to go to Taiwan, he is maybe even planning a trip. What will China do if he goes?

Zhou Bo: I think even in theory, China's response would have to be greater. Because Nancy Pelosi’s visit was not agreed by president Biden, by the pentagon, but she still insisted to go. And our unprecedented large scale exercise was a response. If United States believe in one China, why would you provoke China to this extent? Did anything happen that shows that mainland China would attack Taiwan tomorrow? There's no such indication at all. And so my answer for this is that the United States right now actually is highly divided. This kind of division is not only between the ordinary people and the elite. It's also between the different branches. The legislative versus the executive branch.

And this kind of division is also found even within the military. For example, four star American general talked about mainland China about to attack Taiwan in 2025, only out of his gut feelings, without any proof, without any statistics, he could give his subordinates a memo telling that China was about to attack Taiwan because of his gut feeling. And this is not even agreed upon by pentagon. So there have come this question, how could he make such irresponsible remarks? And why didn't Pentagon regulate him? So it just raises many questions, rather than this genuine question on whether mainland China would really attack Taiwan in 2025.

DW Richard Walker: And there are significant questions at the moment also about the stability of the US-China relationship, which have been thrown up partly by this drama over spying balloons, which in themselves don't necessarily pose any threat, but they've raised concerns of the ability of China and the US to manage a crisis, if an accidental crisis could come up. It said that there really aren't proper hotlines between the two sides to deal with that. How concerned are you about that?

Zhou Bo: This question basically is about how possibly we could have some kind of guardrails about the relationship. You have to make it stable. And ironically, both sides have the same good wish, but they don't know how to do it. You see, because if you talk about the setting of guardrails, it's difficult in that the weaker side probably would consider the stronger one want to freeze the status quo, so as to maintain a kind of superiority. So guardrail can only be established when the strength of the 2 sides is more or less equal. And this is found either during cold war. Because ever from the very beginning of the cold war, the strength of the two superpowers were more or less equal. So they could establish so many confidence building measures, especially in nuclear fields. And this is not the case between Chinese and America's military strength. We are much weaker than the United States. But in a way it doesn't matter.

DW Richard Walker: But not for much longer. It's anticipated that the Chinese military will approach parity with the United States in quite important ways, say in the 2030s. So does that mean that until the 2030s we're going to have to get by with none of these hotlines and guardrails between the US and China?

Zhou Bo: Well, I don't think by 2030 the Chinese military will be as strong as the US military. Because previously we only talk about China becoming world class military by mid-century. We still have a long time to go. So the question is, what does a world class military mean? So of course, the United States is a world class military. For China to catch up with the United States, you have to wait until mid-century. But in the latest report of the 20th congress, we talked about speeding up this process. But still, I would believe it won't be as early as 2030. But remember one thing. This kind of disparity in strength doesn't matter that much in the Western Pacific. Because globally speaking, Chinese military won't compete with United States for global dominance. So long as we are capable of defending our sovereignty, territory integrity in the Western Pacific, that's good enough for us.

DW Richard Walker: And that is the time when you feel that there will be some kind of showdown, do you feel, between the US and China in the coming years in the western pacific? Is that becoming more and more inevitable?

Zhou Bo: No, I don't think so. On the contrary, I believe that will be the time when this relationship become somewhat stabilized. And before it becomes stabilized, this is the most dangerous time. From now to that time, this is the most dangerous time.

DW Richard Walker: And let me finally return to the question that was posed to Wang Yi about the risk of some attack on Taiwan. People around the world are really concerned about that. They've seen the impact that the Ukraine war has had. A war on Taiwan could create even greater destabilization in the world. You’re ex-military in China. What can you say to reassure people that maybe it will simply never happen?

Zhou Bo: I think this kind of comparison, or just because people have seen a war in Europe, doesn't suggest that another similar war will necessarily occur in Taiwan strait. We want peaceful reunification because that is of course in our own interest. What is the use of Taiwan that is totally battered and shattered? So people should not doubt about our sincerity to have peaceful reunification. But we won't just relinquish non-peaceful means. But that is only reserved for different extreme situations.

DW Richard Walker: thank you very much for speaking to us, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo.

Zhou Bo: Thank you very much indeed.

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